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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of 
critical importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum in which 
researchers can accomplish a variety of objectives, such as: (1) present a rough 
draft of a particular piece of acquisition research, (2) structure a “white paper” to 
present opinion or reasoning, (3) put down one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for 
collegial review, (4) present a preliminary draft of an eventual article in an acquisition 
periodical, (5) provide a tutorial (such as a technical note) to accompany a case 
study, and (6) develop a dialogue among practitioners and researchers that 
encourages debate and discussion on topics of mutual importance.   A working 
paper is generally the “internal” outlet for academic and research institutions to 
cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, particularly when in its infant stages.  The 
primary intent is to induce critical thinking about crucial acquisition issues/problems 
that will become part of the acquisition professional body of knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be 
published in other venues, such as in refereed journals and other periodicals, as 
technical reports, as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, 
or as a variety of other similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will 
be challenged, examined and articulated.
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Abstract 
The United States, the EU, and virtually all European nations undertook 
solemn commitments to promote small business access to public procurement and 
R&D programs as part of the 2000 OECD Bologna Charter on Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (SME) Policies.  Notwithstanding these mutual commitments, the 
Europeans have continued challenging America’s Small Business Act of 1953 and 
the set-asides it authorizes as unfair barriers to trade.  Thus far, the United States 
has resisted the criticism.  To put the transatlantic debate over small business 
contracting into concrete terms, this article compares European and US approaches 
to small business procurement assistance.  Subjects of comparison include 
approaches to defining a small business concern; creation of small business 
procurement assistance agencies; availability of suitable contracts through 
reductions in bundling and consolidation; small business goals and set-asides; 
contracting with small firms for economic sustainability and remedial purposes; 
measures to enhance transparency and availability of public procurement 
information for small firms; small business subcontracting policies; and use of public 
procurement to stimulate innovation.  The article notes that Europe is competing with 
the United States for best SME assistance policies.  It concludes that the main 
elements of European and US policies to support SME access to public procurement 
and R&D are very similar and are continuing to further converge.  Accordingly, EU 
trade complaints are without substantial merit.  Indeed, both sides in this debate 
have legitimate reasons to help their small contractors, both sides have weaknesses 
in their SME policies, and both sides can learn from each other’s best practices.   
Keywords:   Small business, small and medium enterprises, SMEs, 
procurement, government contracts, public contracts, set-asides, preferences, 
subcontracting, international trade, competition, innovation, comparative 
procurement policy, United States, European Union, defense industrial base, 
defense procurement, SBIR 
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I. Introduction 
On July 27, 2009, the European Commission (EC) issued its annual report, 
United States Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2008, where it once again 
republished its complaint that “small business set-aside schemes, exemplified by the 
Small Business Act of 1953” are discriminatory measures that “limit bidding 
opportunities for EU [or European Union] contractors” in the US procurement market 
(EC).  The EC raised this same concern in at least two preceding editions of this 
annual report (EC).  In light of this persistent complaint by our trading partners, US 
policymakers in Congress and the Executive Branch would be well-justified in 
considering broad questions of comity, such as the extent to which the Europeans 
themselves have adopted policies and practices that favor small EU firms in 
government procurement; the relative impact of these practices on the entry of US 
firms into the EU procurement system; the motives behind the US and EU small 
business preferences; the extent to which any EU small business practices are 
worth adopting in the US as part of procurement reforms; and implications of 
established small business preferences for future transatlantic trade relations.        
As this paper demonstrates, small business has long held a special place in 
the Western public procurement systems both in Europe and in the United States.  
Public authorities on both sides of the Atlantic use the demand created by 
government contracts to stimulate competitive private entrepreneurship and greater 
economic development within their borders.  Indeed, the United States, the EU’s 
predecessor (the European Community), EU members Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg,  Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom, and European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) members Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland, are all signatories to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 2000 Bologna Charter 
on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Policies.  The Bologna Charter 
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“recommend[s] that in developing SME policies [...] SME participation in public R&D 
programs and procurement contracts [should be] encouraged” (OECD, 2000).   
Throughout the 20th and the early 21st centuries, the United States has been a 
global leader in small business-friendly procurement policies.  However, such 
policies have also seen increasingly popularity with individual European countries, in 
pan-European institutions such as the European Space Agency, and with the 
highest authorities of the European Union, including the European Defense Agency 
and the European Commission itself.  As it turns out, US and European small 
business preferences in contracting are driven by economic and policy concerns 
unrelated to foreign trade, such as countering monopolistic practices in one’s 
domestic industrial base, stimulating innovation, remedying past racial 
discrimination, or promoting employment in local distressed areas.  To the extent 
that small business preferences are used to strengthen domestic industry for 
international competitiveness, this rationale is generally recognized as legitimate by 
European government authorities and learned commentators.      
In 2003, both the United States and the combined European economies had 
gross domestic products (GDPs) roughly equal to $11 trillion (EU, 2003).  With 
admission of 12 new members since 2003, the EU now includes 27 countries: 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania (EC).  The EU’s GDP has further grown from 
$14.34 trillion in 2006, to $14.66 trillion in 2007, and to an estimated $14.82 trillion in 
2008 (“European Union,” 2010).  In the United States, the GDP has further grown 
from $13.83 trillion in 2006, to $14.11 trillion in 2007, to an estimated $14.29 trillion 
in 2008. Companies known in Europe as small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
known in the United States as small businesses or small business concerns (SBs or 
SBCs) account for approximately 65% of the European GDP and 45% of the US 
GDP (EARTO, 2004, October 1).   US small businesses accounted for 50% of 
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private, non-farm GDP from 1998 through 2004, a decline from 58% in the 1950s 
(SBA Office of Advocacy, 2006, April 16).  In the United States, small firms represent 
over 99% of all employers, provide over half the private-sector jobs, and generate 
over two-thirds of new jobs annually.  US small business policies in favor of prime 
contracting resulted in contract awards that created or retained 654,114 jobs in 
Fiscal Year 2008, an increase from 562,000 jobs in Fiscal Year 2005 (SBA, 2009, 
February).   
European small and medium-sized enterprises appear to be almost twice as 
represented in the European procurement market as US small businesses are in the 
US procurement market.  European small firms received on average 42% of all 
prime contracting dollars subject to EU regulation in 2005 (EC, 2008b, June 25), 
while US small firms received slightly more than 23% of Federal prime contracting 
dollars for Fiscal Year 2005 (SBA).  Within EU Member States, SME participation 
“range[d] from 78% and 77% in Slovenia and Slovakia to 35% and 31% in France 
and the U.K.” (EC, 2008b, June 25).  These participation levels exceed US 
participation levels by a magnitude of anywhere from about 50% to almost 400%.  
The comparison is even less favorable to the US procurement system once it’s 
recognized that contracts subject to European regulation must be large enough to 
exceed EU thresholds.  Currently, for central government entities, these thresholds 
are set at about EUR 125,000 for supplies and services, and EUR 4.845 million for 
public works, dropping further to EUR 80,000 and EUR 1 million whenever 
requirements are split into small lots, but increasing to EUR 193,000 for supplies and 
services procured by subnational and local authorities (UK Office, 2010, January 1).   
What’s more, the share of US small businesses in US procurement spending has 
been on the decrease to less than 21.5% in Fiscal Year 2008 (SBA).     
Nonetheless, the European Commission, the leadership of the European 
Parliament, and other European authorities have been increasingly looking for ways 
to utilize the power of public procurement (representing approximately 16% of the 
European GDP) to harness its small business sector and to carry out broader socio-
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economic objectives (EC, CORDIS, 2009; Manners, 2003; European People’s; 
Matheson, 2008).  Because governments in the United States and Europe (including 
individual European governments) are concerned with economic competitiveness 
and development, they recognize the unique economic and social contributions of 
small business as well as the unique challenges faced by small firms.  In the context 
of public procurement, small businesses often become the focus of enterprise policy 
considerations (dealing with economic development and anti-monopolistic 
competition), industrial base policy considerations (assuring an economic foundation 
to achieve political objectives such as strong defense), or innovation policy 
objectives.   
Over time, all public authorities are eventually confronted with the question of 
the proper role of small business in public procurement.  Although the government 
as a buyer takes on many attributes of commercial firms, the activities of 
government in buying goods and services do not represent free-market activities.  
The government is spending public funds for public purposes.  As a result, the 
taxpayers through their elected representatives (or, in the case of Europe, through 
national governments), may demand accountable decision-making in procurement 
and fair return in the form of work funded through government contracts.  Often, the 
government is buying the “public goods” that the market would not otherwise supply 
in the same way, the same manner, or in the same quantities the government sets in 
response to public priorities.1  Further, while and, in part, because the government 
                                            
1  For the industry, public goods are “instances in which marginal private net product falls short of marginal 
social net product, because incidental services are performed to third parties from whom it is technically 
difficult to exact payment” (Bell & Parchomovsky, 2005, pp. 531, 560, n. 159) (Abraham and Parchomovsky 
cite Arthur Cecil Pigou’s 2002 The Economics of Welfare, pages 183-84).  Some commentators have argued 
that public procurement is a market for items which constitute or resemble pure public goods:   
Government contracts frequently involve the construction of what economists call ‘public goods.’  
“Public goods” are items—such as bridges, roads, and dams—which everyone is entitled to use 
whether or not they pay for the item. Thus, no market incentive exists to create such goods, because by 
definition even those who fail to pay for the good may benefit. As one author has noted: “Some goods 
and services cannot be provided through the price system because there is no way to exclude citizens 
from consuming the goods whether they pay for them or not. For example, there is no way to prevent 
citizens from benefiting from national expenditures on defense whether they pay money toward 
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buyer imposes significant regulatory compliance burdens and resembles a 
monopsonist,2 the government procurement industry tends towards monopolistic or 
oligopolistic consolidation and concentration. These factors bring additional 
influences to bear on the private markets, with the potential to strongly encourage or 
strongly discourage economic activity by many private enterprises. 3    
                                                                                                                                       
defense or not. Consequently, the price system cannot be used to provide such goods; no one will pay 
for them since they will receive them whether they pay or not. [...] The Government provides many 
public goods. Such goods are consumed collectively, or jointly, and it is inefficient to try to price them 
in a market. They tend to be indivisible; thus they frequently cannot be split into pieces and be bought 
and sold in a market” (Mansfield, 1986). Thus, both theoretically and practically, government projects 
have no market value because the public has no incentive to purchase them (Perloff, 1993, pp. 185, 
225, n. 302). 
 
Others have argued that the means by which the government provides public goods involves both pure public-
good-type items and commercial items that are bought in a different manner: 
Government agencies purchase essentially two kinds of goods and services.  The first consists of off-
the-shelf commodities and services that are routinely bought and sold in ordinary commercial settings. 
The second is made of specialized products such as weapons systems. [...] Even for the off-the-shelf 
goods and services, however, government procurement statutes and regulations sometimes may result 
in a definition of a relatively narrow relevant market by restricting the range of firms that can compete 
for specific contracts. [...]  Specialized goods and services usually present more difficult market 
definition/market power issues.  For many nonstandard items, particularly military hardware, the 
government is virtually the sole purchaser. (Kovacic & Sims, 1990, pp. 32-33) 
 
2 “The government is not an ordinary purchaser, and it often is the only buyer (a monopsonist) for specialized 
equipment in question” (Kovacic & Sims, 1990, pp. 32-33).  For instance, according to the US Government 
Accountability Office, the Department of Defense has actively encouraged and supported consolidation in the 
US defense industrial base: 
 The sharp decline in spending by DOD since 1985 has resulted in a dramatic consolidation of the 
defense industry, which is now more concentrated than at any time in more than half a century. [...]  
Since 1990, there has been a dramatic reduction in the number of prime contractors in 10 of the 12 
markets DOD identified as important to national security. [...]  This concentration was not unexpected.  
DOD has encouraged the defense industry to consolidate facilities and eliminate excess capacity to 
remain competitive and financially viable. (GAO, 1998)   
 
The European defense market has a similar structure: 
The economic characteristics of the defense sector are monopsony, the high costs of defense 
equipment, and the necessity to take life-cycle costs into account. [...] The defense sector is 
characterized as a monopsony.  This means that the producers of hard-defense material often have only 
one prospective customer for their products: the government.  Only their national government or, 
through exports, a foreign government will buy the equipment. (Trybus, 1999, p. 4) 
3 When the government actively facilitates industrial base consolidation, its actions have tended to reduce 
competition, create significant financial risks for small firms at all tiers, and empower large suppliers to misuse 
market power by keeping out better innovations and solutions from small firms:  
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There are both numerous similarities and differences among the small 
business-specific procurement policies developed by the United States government 
and by the various levels of government in Europe.  As shown below, these policies 
are rooted in the peculiar public procurement systems created on both sides of the 
Atlantic and in the specific economic, social, or other goals that public authorities 
hoped to accomplish.  This paper will examine small business procurement policies 
across several key considerations, including the overall policy framework, definitions 
of small firms, creation of specialized institutions to assist small business with 
breaking into public procurements, access of small firms to suitable contracts, 
increasing transparency, promotion of economic and social sustainability, stimulation 
of innovation, and related considerations.  While attempts will be made to make 
comparisons between policies that are representative of the US approach and one 
or more European approaches, this paper is not meant to provide a comprehensive 
review of small business procurement laws and regulations in every US government 
agency or in every European country.  In addition, the role of political considerations 
in developing small business procurement policy is outside the scope of this paper.      
 
                                                                                                                                       
The US Department of Defense actively encouraged and supported this defense industry consolidation 
and transformation in the United States in the 1990s, provided that a merger “produced efficiencies” 
and did not “significantly reduce competition.”  In fact, the US government financially supported at 
least seven defense firm mergers between 1993 and 1997. [...] [G]iven the paucity of large platform 
procurements, for second-tier suppliers particularly, selection or non-selection as a participant in a 
major procurement project may be a “bet-the-company” proposition. [...] There is some conjecture as 
to whether the defense industry will continue to be dominated by a small number of “system 
integrator” defense contractors. One [prediction favors] the emergence of a new generation of 
“dozens” of “new and innovative” companies in the global defense industry, at least some of which 
will grow and mature into major industry players. [...]  However, while small, niche players will 
undoubtedly continue to spring up and survive, the prediction that they will grow to become major 
industry players largely disregards the overwhelming bottom-line financial strength of the large 
systems integrators, making it perhaps more likely that large system integrators will acquire promising 
emergent defense companies or promising technologies rather than that the small, innovative 
companies will achieve a “critical mass.” [...]  A particular risk that consolidation of the defense 
industry presents is that an entrenched supplier with a vested economic interest in a particular 
technology may use its financial or political influence to prevent adoption of a competing, superior 
technology developed by a small, innovative firm. (Marks & Fry, 2007) 
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II.   Small Business Procurement Policy: 
General Framework 
In order to understand the similarities and differences between the details of 
policies on small business contracting in the United States and in Europe, it is 
necessary to start by examining the fundamental principles that drive these policies.  
Once this is done, it becomes clear that fundamental small business contracting 
principles in the United States are, by and large, mutually reinforcing, while 
fundamental SME contracting principles in Europe are, by and large, in tension. 
A. The US Approach: Maximum Practicable Opportunity to 
Ensure Fair Share 
The US small business procurement policy is generally set in Section 1 and 
other provisions of the Small Business Act of 19534 as binding law.  This law 
emphasizes “full and free competition” as the “essence of the American economic 
system of private enterprise” (USC, 2010, Section 631a).  The law notes that such 
unfettered competition is essential for achievement of pro-competitive economic 
goals such as “free markets” and “free entry into business” (USC, 2010, Section 
631a).  The Act also notes the social goals of increasing “opportunities for the 
expression and growth of personal initiative and individual judgment” and the 
defense policy goal of strengthening “the security of this Nation” through 
“preservation and expansion of such competition” (USC, 2010, Section 631a).  The 
Act further directs the Federal government “to use all practical means and to take 
such actions as are necessary [...] [to] reduce the concentration of economic 
resources and expand competition” (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 631a(a)).   
                                            
4 Public Law No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (July 30, 1953), currently codified as amended in USC Title 15 §§ 631-
657o (2010).  Section 1 of the Small Business Act is codified in Title 15, Section 631 of the United States Code. 
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To implement these goals, the Act embraces two related principles to govern 
the awards of Federal contracts and subcontracts.  These policy principles 
emphasize the need for fairness to small contractors, both from the standpoint of 
acquisition planning, strategies, and process, as well as from the standpoint of 
measurable outcomes and results.    
The first such principle is the principle of “maximum practicable opportunity” 
to participate in Federal contracts and subcontracts: 
It is the policy of the United States that small business concerns, small 
business concerns owned and controlled by veterans, small business 
concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, qualified 
HUBZone small business concerns, small business concerns owned and 
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and small 
business concerns owned and controlled by women, shall have the maximum 
practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by 
any Federal agency, including contracts and subcontracts for subsystems, 
assemblies, components, and related services for major systems. (USC, 
2010, Title 15, Section 637d(1))5   
The “maximum practicable opportunity” principle is generally implemented 
through process-type actions such as procurement strategies, subcontracting plans 
and award procedures, publicizing of procurement opportunities, providing small 
firms with information on procurement laws and regulations, breaking up large or 
complex contracts, and reserving or setting procurement opportunities aside for 
small firms.6  
The second such principle is the principle of “fair proportion,” set forth as 
follows: 
                                            
5 Accord USC Title 15 § 644(e)(1) (2010): “To the maximum extent practicable, procurement strategies used by 
the various agencies having contracting authority shall facilitate the maximum participation of small business 
concerns as prime contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers.”  
6 See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SBA: Recognizing Best Practices in Increasing 
Opportunities for Small Businesses, 
http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/goals/SBA_GOALING_BEST_PRACTICE.html (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009).  
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It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, 
counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-
business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure 
that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for 
property and services for the Government (including but not limited to 
contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be 
placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the 
total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises, and to 
maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation. (USC, 2010, Title 
15, Section 631(a)) 
The “fair proportion” principles is generally implemented through planning 
measures such as contracting and subcontracting goals established by Congress, 
the President, Federal buying agencies, and the Small Business Administration, as 
well as through accountability reporting such as the annual Small Business 
Procurement Scorecard.7   
In practice, these two principles and their implementing measures are often 
intertwined and conflated.  As will be discussed below, this is a distinctively 
American approach, as the Europeans historically have sought to distinguish 
between measures assuring opportunity and measures assuring a certain 
participation share to their SMEs.  Examples of such conflation in the United States 
include agency-specific fair share goals and set-asides of specific contracts or 
classes of contracts to achieve those goals (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 644(a), 
(g)).  For instance, in interpreting the so-called “Rule of Two” in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which requires agencies to set aside any contract 
above $100,000 unless there is no reasonable expectation of receiving fair-priced 
offers from two or more small businesses, the US Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) explained that “the Rule of Two is intended to implement the Small Business 
Act language in 15 U.S.C. sect. 644(a), quoted above, requiring that small 
businesses receive a ‘fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for 
                                            
7 See, e.g. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SBA Goaling Program, 
http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/goals/index.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).   
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property and services for the Government’ or support national defense” (Delex 
Systems, 2008).  In procurements which were purportedly exempt from the Small 
Business Act’s set-aside requirements by Executive Branch regulations, such as the 
Federal Supply Schedule task order competitions, small business size can 
nonetheless be used as a “significant evaluation factor” on an order-by-order basis 
(GSA et al., 2010, Section 8.405-5).    
The Small Business Act was the initiative of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
who wanted to use the procurement system to maintain competition in the US 
economy.8  Soon after the passage of the Small Business Act, President Eisenhower 
                                            
8 For two decades since 1932, the Herbert Hoover, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Harry S. Truman 
administrations have established limited-scope small business assistance agencies: the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC), the Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC), the Office of Small Business (OSB) in the US 
Department of Commerce, and the Small Defense Plants Administration (SDPA), which focused mainly on 
financing and military procurement set-asides or other assistance.  “To continue the important functions of 
the[se] earlier agencies, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed creation of a new small business agency -- the 
Small Business Administration (SBA)” with a comprehensive mandate to provide government-wide and 
economy-wide assistance to small firms (SBA).  With creation of the SBA and the Cabinet Council on Small 
Business, President Eisenhower made small business procurement assistance a top policy priority for his 
administration:  
The facts are plain on the record. They confirm the fact that this Administration has done more for 
small business than any prior administration [...].  First, we created the Small Business Administration, 
the first independent peace-time agency to devote itself exclusively to matters of interest to small 
business. This made a central focus for problems inherent in carrying on millions of small free-
enterprise undertakings in America.  Second, because these problems cut across the whole area of 
Federal activities, we established this year a Cabinet Committee on Small Business to be responsible 
on a continuing basis for developing policies and getting prompt action. Within this framework, we 
have taken positive steps to assist small business in these different ways: [...] (3) Government 
Procurement. During the last three fiscal years, Federal agencies directly awarded to small business 
concerns contracts totaling $11.3 billion. This represents 22.2 percent of the total prime contracts 
awarded by the Federal Government during the period, considerably more than the 19.4 percent share 
awarded to small business during the fiscal years 1951-1953. Moreover, during the last three fiscal 
years small business received subcontracts amounting to additional billions. I was glad to know, for 
example, that over 400 small business firms are working on the construction at Shippingport, 
Pennsylvania, of the world's first large-scale atomic plant to make power exclusively for civilian use.   
(4) Government Set-Asides. This Administration has extended to other large Federal agencies--such as 
the Veterans' Administration, the General Services Administration, and the Interior, Agriculture, 
Commerce and Post Office Departments-the set-aside policy which had before applied only to the 
Department of Defense. Under this policy, certain governmental purchases are set aside for award 
exclusively to small business concerns. [...] (7) Management Counseling. To assist small business, the 
Small Business Administration and the Commerce Department collect expert information on 
management problems. Through publications, letters, and direct interviews by hundreds of field agents, 
they counsel with the owners of small businesses regarding management, procurement, new products, 
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created the Cabinet Committee on Small Business to spearhead the implementation 
of the Act and of small business-related activities throughout the Federal 
government.  Writing to the Committee Chairman Arthur Burns, President 
Eisenhower observed:  
[Small businesses] serve continuously as dynamic influence in our enterprise 
system.  It is often through them that new products and new processes are 
first brought into use.  Equally important, it is in small concerns that many 
men and women find an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to serve 
constructively in the business world.  For these and related reasons, 
government policies that make it easier for these new businesses to be 
established and that foster the growth of small concerns enhance the welfare 
of the whole economy. (Eisenhower, 1956, June 1)   
It must be noted that the US small business procurement policy is a Federal 
policy that exists within the Constitutional framework of separate state and Federal 
sovereignties.9  For this reason, in the United States, the states and the Federal 
government maintain separate public procurement systems.  Therefore, the US 
procurement system at the national level does not, in general, regulate 
procurements by the states.  One notable exception are small and minority business 
preferences in Federally-funded contracts awarded by States and local governments 
under President Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order 12432, Minority Business 
                                                                                                                                       
and financing. In particular, they help small firms get on government bidders' lists.  Together with the 
procurement officers of all Federal Departments, the Small Business Administration organized 20 
conferences in all parts of the country at the outset of the current major buying season. These meetings, 
which are attended by a very high percentage of small manufacturers in the nearby area, give full 
information on opportunities to do business with the Federal Government. I understand you personally 
attended the recent conference in nearby Syracuse on October ninth.   Because this Administration is 
not content to rest on its record, progressive and sound as it is, we have been moving ahead with the 
recommendations for future action contained in the recent Progress Report of the Cabinet Committee 
on Small Business. One of these recommendations is the extension of the term of the Small Business 
Administration beyond the date of its present statutory expiration. Others are: [...] (2) Procurement--a 
comprehensive review of procurement policies, procedures and legislation, with a view to increasing 
small business' share in government contracts; steps to encourage greater sub-contracting to small 
business; and measures to insure that the need for progress payments by a small business concern will 
not handicap its obtaining a government contract. (Eisenhower, 1956, October 22) 
 
9 See US CONST. amend. X.  
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Enterprise Development (Reagan, 1983).  The most well-known of such preferences 
is the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program of the US Department of 
Transportation and the US Small Business Administration, which promotes 
participation by small minority-owned and women-owned firms in Federally-funded 
highway projects by requiring expenditure of at least 10% of highway funds for 
projects with such firms (USC, 2010, Title 49, Section 47113; DoT, SBA).    
B. The European Approach: Tension Between Fair Access, 
SME Competitiveness, and Fair Return 
In Europe, the small business policy, more accurately, small and medium 
enterprises (SME) policy, with regard to public procurement has been undertaken 
both by the European Union government bodies as well as by national and local 
governments.  The European Commission restated its historic approach to small 
business procurement as follows: 
Small and medium-sized enterprises are a unique source of innovation and 
competition in the internal market and account for 99.8% of the total number 
of EU enterprises.  The European Commission has always paid particular 
attention to them.  By facilitating their access to procurement opportunities, 
EU procurement policy allows those firms to strengthen their competitiveness 
and enables them to contribute more towards growth, employment, and 
competitiveness of the European economy.  Commission action has mainly 
been focused on creating a level playing field where bids from firms, whatever 
their size or origin, have similar chances of success.  Since the early 1990s, 
measures have been focused specifically on SME’s needs in terms of 
simplification, information, services support, and promoting cooperation 
between SMEs on contracts. (2004, March)10 
In 2000, the European Council set in motion a long-term reform of 
procurement and other policies throughout EU Member States by adopting The 
European Charter for Small Enterprises (European Council, 2000).  The European 
Charter directed the EC and Member States to “pursue the reforms underway aiming 
                                            
10 The European Commission (2004, March) report cites EC, 1992, June 1; 1990, May 7; 1998a, March 11.  
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at the completion in the Union of a true internal market, user-friendly for small 
business, in critical areas for development of small businesses including  [...] public 
procurement” (European Council, 2000).  
Historically, European efforts to promote small business procurements have 
been subject to a number of legal constraints.  Arguably, these constraints stemmed 
primarily from various provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (the EC Treaty), now called the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union,11 
and of the procurement directives adopted by the European Commission (EC, 2009, 
December 17).  The EC Treaty “covers all public-sector procurement contracts with 
the European Community, no matter what their value.  The Treaty sets down 
principles to prevent discrimination against firms from any member state” (UK Small, 
2004, November).  Contracts above various monetary thresholds established by the 
European Commission are regulated by the Commission’s procurement directives.  
Specifically, the Treaty-based constraints are known as the “four freedoms”: 
Article 6 (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality), Article 30 (free 
movement of goods), Article 48 (free movement of workers), and Articles 52 
and 59 (freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment).  
These provisions prohibit not only direct discrimination on the basis of 
nationality, but also treatment by a Member State which in effect 
discriminates against, or does not provide equal treatment to, a person or 
entity from another Member State.  The importance of these provisions is that 
they provide a binding standard against which to consider all public 
procurement decisions by public contracting authorities. (McCrudden, 1998, 
pp. 219, 223).   
For instance, in 1992 and 1993, the European Court of Justice invoked these “four 
freedoms” in two cases, Commission of European Communities v. Italy and 
                                            
11 “The Reform Treaty will contain two substantive clauses amending respectively the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). The TEU will keep its present name 
and the TEC will be called Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, the Union having a single legal personality. 
The word ‘Community’ will throughout be replaced by the word ‘Union’; it will be stated that the two Treaties 
constitute the Treaties on which the Union is founded and that the Union replaces and succeeds the 
Community” (EU, 2007, July 20, Annex I, Section I(2)).  Because most literature cited here refers to the former 
“EC Treaty” name, that reference will be used. 
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Commission of European Communities v. Denmark, to invalidate national and local 
percentage-of-work, main-office-location, labor, materials, goods, and equipment 
preferences that effectively favored or could have favored local SMEs (McCrudden, 
1998, pp. 223-224).12   
European legal scholars disagree on whether these principles, as interpreted 
by the European Court of Justice and the European Commission, would extend to 
situations where preferences are available to SMEs without facial or as-applied 
discrimination on the basis of nationality.  However, the weight of authority and logic 
appears to fall on the side favoring SME preferences as compatible with the EC 
Treaty.  Professor Christopher McCrudden has argued in as early as 1998 that “[an] 
attractive possibility [in response to the Commission of European Communities v. 
Italy and Commission of European Communities v. Denmark decisions] is to open 
up preferences to the enterprises of other regions by providing that similar 
preferences apply to those enterprises which can demonstrate that they too fit within 
the social criteria laid down (so-called ‘communitarisation’).  Such arrangements 
would need to ensure that contracts were open to all in fact as well as in form” 
(1998, p. 223).  The legal viability of these arrangements under the EC Treaty 
“seems to depend on one’s conception of the principle of equality under the Treaty 
and the obligations that flow from it” (Hatzis, 2009, pp. 345, 349-350).  According to 
the interpretation favored by Nicholas Hatzis, “[i]f the equality and non-discrimination 
obligations deriving from the Treaty have similar content with the corresponding 
obligations in the procurement directives” which he construed to prohibit 
“discrimination on the basis of nationality of any other ground,” than contracts 
subject only to the Treaty “may be subject to an onerous equality requirement which 
considerably restricts the discretion of contracting authorities and leaves no room for 
set-asides” (Hatzis, 2009).  This interpretation of the Treaty rests chiefly on a ten 
                                            
12 McCrudden (1998) cites Case C-243/89, Comm’n v. Italy, 1992 E.C.R. I-3415, and Case C-360/89, Comm’n 
v. Denmark , 1993 E.C.R. I-3353.  
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year-old, self-contradictory European Commission communication which rejected 
SME prime contracting set-asides in favor of mandatory SME subcontracting and 
“good government” assistance such as publication of contracting opportunities 
(Hatzis, 2009, p. 347),13 and on two European Court of Justice decisions, Parking 
Brixen v. Gemeinde Brixen14 and ANAV v. Comune di Bari.15  The problem with this 
interpretation is the weakness of its supporting authorities.  For example, the 
European Court of Justice decisions cited by Mr. Hatzis concerned government self-
dealing in public procurements, i.e., situations where local government authorities 
have awarded contracts to entities they controlled.  Self-dealing by local 
governments is inherently discriminatory of foreign suppliers, and, indeed, can 
induce private-sector bidding in reliance on a misleading appearance of an open 
competition.  Of course, such design flaws are not intrinsic to EU-wide SME set-
asides, so the cases can hardly be described as on point.   
A contrary view advocated by commentators such as Andrew Erridge, Sue 
Arrowsmith, and Peter Kunzlik asserts that “it is wrong to read into the Treaty 
additional equality requirements which can only be derived from procurement 
directives.  If this view is correct, then a policy of reserving contracts for SMEs could 
be lawful provided that it does not discriminate against SMEs from other member 
states” (Erridge, 1998).16  At the present time, it seems clear from European legal 
scholarship that the European Court of Justice has not foreclosed the possibility that 
SME preferences which are non-discriminatory on nationality grounds are perfectly 
consistent with the EC Treaty.  Therefore, “if there is a change in policy by the 
Commission to allow certain contracts to be set aside for SMEs by including size of 
                                            
13 Hatzis (2009) cites Communication to the Council: Promoting SME Participation in Public Procurement in 
the Community (EC, 1990, May 7). 
14 Case C-458/03, 2005 ECR I-8612. 
15 Case C-410/04, 2006 ECR I-3303. 
16 “Set-asides are legal under European legislation for contracts below European thresholds.  However, this use 
must not discriminate against SMEs from other Member States” (Erridge, 1998). 
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the company as criteria for excluding tenderers the directives could be amended 
without contradicting Treaty obligations, i.e., nondiscrimination on the grounds of 
nationality” (Erridge, 1998).  As this paper demonstrates, the Commission and other 
European authorities have been modifying their SME policies to such an extent that 
the Commission communication on which Hatzis relied appears to no longer reflect 
current European policy.   
  The European Commission’s procurement directives further implement the 
Treaty by establishing “procedures and standards (based on openness, non-
discrimination, and competition) for choosing tenderers and awarding contracts with 
an estimated value above a set limit” (Erridge, 1998).  The EC Treaty and the 
European Commission directives have provided the overall framework for small 
business procurement policies of the Member states and their political subdivisions.  
Over the last five years, European authorities attempted to minimize Treaty-
based and policy-based constraints by issuing at least two legally binding Directives 
which expressly authorize and direct various forms of targeted procurement 
assistance to SMEs: Directive 2004/18/EC of March 31, 2004, On the Coordination 
of Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts, 
and Public Service Contracts (European Parliament, 2004, March 31). (a.k.a. the 
Public Procurement Directive or the “classic” procurement directive), and Directive 
2009/81/EC of July 13, 2009, On the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of 
Certain Works Contracts, Supply Contracts, and Service Contracts by Contracting 
Authorities or Entities in the Fields of Defense and Security, and Amending 
Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (European Parliament, 2009, July 13). 
(a.k.a. the Defense Procurement Directive).  EU Member States are required to 
achieve compliance with the Public Procurement Directive by January 31, 2006, and 
with the Defense Procurement Directive by August 21, 2011.  Both Directives 
recognize that such assistance would be appropriate and desirable.  In particular, 
the Defense Procurement Directive called on Member States to limit exclusions of 
defense items from European Commission directives and rules as authorized under 
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Article 296(1)(b) of the Treaty17 in the “context” of promoting the European Defense 
Technological and Industrial Base, including support for SME defense suppliers 
(European Parliament, 2009, July 13, Recital 3).18  
The Public Procurement Directive “is based on [European] Court of Justice 
case law, in particular case law on award criteria, which clarified the possibilities for 
the contracting authorities to meet the needs of the public concerned, including in 
the environmental and/or social area, provided that such criteria are linked to the 
subject matter of the contract, do not confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the 
contracting authority, are expressly mentioned, and comply with fundamental 
principles” of the Treaty Establishing the European Community such as free 
movement of goods, free establishment of business, equal treatment, non-
discrimination, proportionality, and transparency (European Parliament, 2004, March 
31, Recital 2).   The classic directive recognized that social considerations, including 
SME participation, can be made part of the contracting process in two 
                                            
17 As explained by Professor Martin Trybus:  
Defense spending can be separated n two categories.  The first is so-called “hard-defense material,” for 
example, battle tanks, fighter aeroplanes, and warships, which can be used for military purposes only.  
This is excluded from the EC Treaty by Article 296(1)(b) [...] The second category is the so-called 
“dual-use material” or “soft-defense material,” for example, cross-country vehicles, transport aircraft, 
and rescue ships, which can be used for military or civil purposes.  This is covered by the EC Treaty 
and the directives, although some contracts for this material may fall within derogations from the 
Treaty and its directives which provide for protections of national security concerns, such as Articles 
36, 38(3) and 56(1) [...] Civil goods purchased by the defense procurement authorities, for example, 
office equipment, are also covered.  Thus the Community has jurisdiction over the market for dual-use 
material and civil goods but not over that for hard-defense material – a very weak position. (1999)  
 
18 Directive 2009/81/EC cites Interpretive Communication on the Application of the Article 296 of the Treaty in 
the Field of Defense Procurement (EC, 2006, July 12) and Communication from the European Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee on 
the Regions, A Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defense Industry (2007, May 12).  
Professor Christopher Yukins argues that the Defense Procurement Directive may limit national socioeconomic 
programs of various European Member States, but may also effectively create a socioeconomic preference in 
support of European defense firms and strengthen the defense industrial base exclusions of non-European firms 
from the common European defense market (2009, November 4, par. 383).  This interpretation is supported by 
the Commission Communication COM 2007(764) final, Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive 
European Defense Industry (EC, 2007, May 12) (calling for the need to reduce intra-EU barriers while 
improving the standing of the EU Defense and Technology Industrial Base as compared to the US industrial 
base).      
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circumstances.  The first circumstance involves including social consideration as 
part of award criteria when awards are made on the “most economically 
advantageous tender,” or best value for money, basis (European Parliament, 2004, 
March 31, Recital 46).  The second circumstance includes imposition of social 
contract performance conditions to which contractors must agree regardless of 
whether the award is made on the lowest price basis or the most economically 
advantageous tender/best value basis (European Parliament, 2004, March 31, 
Articles 23, 26). 
The Defense Procurement Directive goes even further than the Public 
Procurement Directive in its support for SME procurement assistance by tying the 
support for SMEs to competitiveness and national security goals:  
Member States agree on the need to foster, develop and sustain a European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base that is capability driven, 
competent and competitive. In order to achieve this objective, Member States 
may use different tools, in conformity with Community law, aiming at a truly 
European defence equipment market and a level playing field at both 
European and global levels. They should also contribute to the in-depth 
development of the diversity of the European defense-related supplier base, 
in particular by supporting the involvement of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and non-traditional suppliers in the European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base, fostering industrial cooperation and 
promoting efficient and responsive lower tier suppliers. . . The Commission 
should carry out a periodic assessment to examine whether the defense 
equipment market is functioning in an open, transparent and competitive way, 
including the impact of this Directive on the market, for example on 
involvement of SMEs. (European Parliament, 2009, July 13, Recitals 3, 79)  
The European Commission (EC) echoes the same themes in its policies.  On 
June 25, 2008, the European Commission issued Commission Communication COM 
(2008) 394, Think Small First: A Small Business Act for Europe.  The Small 
Business Act for Europe is a set of ten principles to assist SMEs.  One of these 
principles calls on European authorities to “[a]dapt public policy tools to SME needs; 
facilitate SMEs’ participation in public procurement and better use State Aid 
possibilities for SMEs” (EC, 2008a, June 25).  As part of this effort, EC Commission 
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Staff published a voluntary European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access of 
SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts (EC, 2008b, June 25).  The European Code 
states that “increased involvement of SMEs into public purchasing will result in 
higher competition for public contracts, leading to better value for money for 
contracting authorities.  In addition to this, more competitive and transparent public 
procurement practices will allow SMEs to unlock their growth and innovation 
potential with a positive impact on the European economy” (EC, 2008b, June 25).  
The Code lists solutions to assist small businesses with the following issues: 
“overcoming difficulties relating to the size of the contracts; ensuring access to 
relevant information; improving quality and understanding of the information 
provided; settling proportionate qualification levels and financial requirements; 
alleviating the administrative burden; putting more emphasis on value for money 
rather than price; giving sufficient time to draw up tenders; and ensuring payments 
on time” (EC, 2008b, June 25).   
Similar policies or practices – some described in the European Code - have 
been adopted by EU Member State governments, EU agencies such as the 
European Defense Agency, and non-EU organizations such as the European Space 
Agency.19  For instance, in the United Kingdom, “[t]he Government’s policy on SMEs 
                                            
19 See, e.g., Pieter Taal, Assistant Director, Industry and Market Directorate, European Defense Agency, 
Presentation, Depth and Diversity of a Competitive EDTIB: SMEs in Defense (January 13, 2010) 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/presentations/stockholm_conference/depht_and_diversity_of
_a_competitive_edtib_en.pdf (describing SME procurement assistance measures including SME-focused 
research programs, assistance with low-value contracts, and subcontracting opportunity requirements);  BAKER 
& MCKENZIE EUROPE, REMEDIES AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAWS IN EUROPE, at 72 (3d ed. 2009) (citing 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, the [German Act Against Restraints on Competition], 26 August 
1998, BGBl. I at 2546, § 97(3) (F.R.G.), which requires consideration of SME interests in contracts meeting or 
exceeding EU thresholds through subdivision of contracts into trade and partial lots); Ioannis Petrou, The 
European Space Agency’s Procurement System: A Critical Assessment, 37 PUB. CONT. L. J., 141 (2008) 
(discussing ESA SME preferences); Martin Burgi, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and Procurement Law 
– European Legal Framework and German Experiences, 4 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 284 (2007) (discussing SME-
friendly and SME-favoring practices such as unbundling of contracts, grouping or teaming of small companies, 
mandatory SME subcontracting requirements, easier proof of suitability, division of contracts into lots, and 
limitations of lots per bidder); Ciara Kennedy-Loest, Spreading Contract Work to Ensure Security of Supply 
and Maintain Competition: The Issues Under the EC Directives, 2 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 116 (2007) (arguing that 
procurement measures favoring SMEs at contract size, teaming, qualification, award, and performance stages 
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is to encourage and support these organizations to compete for public sector 
contracts where this is consistent with the value for money policy of the U.K. 
regulations, EU Treaty principles, and EU procurement directives” (UK Office).  In 
July 2009, the Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment adopted a 
report on SME procurement assistance stating that “increased involvement of SMEs 
leads to better value for money” (Ireland, 2009, July).  Procurement policies 
providing various supports for SMEs either directly or indirectly can be found both in 
long-term EU Member States, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and 
Italy, and in new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria 
or Estonia.20 
Indeed, support for SMEs appears inherent in procurements conducted by 
Europe-wide defense and space structures such as the European Defense Agency 
(EDA), its predecessor the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), and the 
European Space Agency (ESA).  Such support is driven by a comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                       
are justified because they would carry out the objective of “opening up of public procurement to competition” 
as stated in the 2004/18/EC Public Procurement Directive); Andrew Erridge, Involvement of SMEs in Public 
Procurement, 2 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 37 (1998) (comparing early EU and British small business procurement 
initiatives with US initiatives).   
20 See, e.g. UK Public Contracts Regulations, 2006, S.I. 2006/5, Art. 7, ¶ 39, 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/uksi_20060005_en.pdf  (authorizing the use of social considerations as 
conditions for performance of contracts to the extent consistent with European Community law); Bulgaria Law 
for the Public Procurement, as amended, SG 56 1999, Arts. 6, 12, and 41 (June 9th, 1999) 
http://www.bcnl.org/doc_en.php?DID=316 (requiring consideration of SME subcontractor participation in 
awards of high-value prime contracts and authorizing the Council of Ministers to develop measures ensuring 
SME participation in low-level contracts.); Veiko Lember and Veiko Vaske, Public Procurement in Post-
Transitional Context: The Case of Estonia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT, 409, 420 (Kvi Thai ed. 2009) (noting that low national thresholds and a procurement model 
that disfavors consolidated tenders can be deemed to favor SMEs);  Laurance Folliot-Lalliot, The Separation 
Between the Qualification Phase  and the Award Phase in French Procurement  Law, 3 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 
155, 158-159 (2009) (arguing that Articles 45, 50, and 51 of the French Public Procurement Code encourage 
SMEs to rely on qualifications of large businesses as part of bidder teams or groupings); Mario Comba, 
Selection and Award Criteria in Italian Public Procurement Law, 3 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 122, 124 (2009) 
(arguing that Italian administrative judges scrutinize contract qualifications requirements so as to protect SMEs 
from subjective biases of contracting authorities);  Marcello Thompson Mello Guimaraes, The Northern 
European Subset: An Open Platform for Cross-Border Procurement, 4 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 175 (2008) (arguing 
that Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland created an e-procurement project, in part, to 
assist SMEs with cross-border procurements).    
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European industrial base development policy based on the principle of juste retour 
or “fair return” based on national investment in procurements, and its more recent 
formulation known as the principle of “mutual benefit” (Petrou, 2008; Georgopolous, 
2006; 2005). The principle of fair return resembles national earmarking and “can be 
described as the equitable industrial return that states require for their domestic 
industries as a result of the states' participation to a particular collaborative program. 
The principle is considered important for countries with small or medium sized 
defense industries because it secures the involvement of their domestic firms in the 
defense procurement market” (Georgopolous, 2006, p. 56). Its more recent 
formulation, the principle of mutual benefit “reflects the idea that in order for the 
establishment of a European Defense Equipment Market to be meaningful the 
participation of the largest possible majority of Member States is needed. In 
particular the aforementioned principle tries to bring on board those Member States 
which have small and medium-sized defense industries” (Georgopolous, 2005, p. 
111).  Arguably, the latter formulation targets SMEs from all EU countries, signifying 
a transition in defense industrial policy from the principle of juste retour towards 
support for SMEs (Georgopolous, 2005, p. 111; 2006, p. 57). In particular, at the 
European Defense Agency, its Steering Board on May 15, 2006 adopted the Code 
of Best Practices in the Supply Chain (COBPSC) in order “to ensure fair 
opportunities especially for small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)” and “to 
promote opportunities, where competition is efficient, practical, and economically or 
technologically appropriate on a level playing field basis for qualified and competent 
suppliers (both in-house and external), including SMEs” (EDA, 2006, May 15).  This 
Code is enforced through Member States reciprocity.  Another foundational EDA 
policy document, the Strategy for the European Defense Technological and 
Industrial Base, states:  
We know that our vision of a healthy, competitive and integrated future EDTIB 
will not be realized if our market-opening efforts are perceived to be simply a 
bonanza for the large prime contractors. With industry’s active cooperation, 
we need to drive the benefits of competition down the supply chain – so that 
excellent second- and third-tier companies, often SMEs (with their typical 
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flexibility and capacity to innovate), are able to prosper in a European scale of 
market. This makes economic as well as political sense: the future success of 
the DTIB in Europe will depend upon effective utilization of human capital and 
innovation wherever these are to be found in Europe – in SMEs, and in 
suppliers not always associated with defense (universities, software houses, 
providers of dual-use technology), and in the new Member States. We note 
the slowness of Western European prime contractors to see the new Member 
States as places to invest, rather than just sell. (EDA, 2007, May 14)   
At the European Space Agency, the policy of assisting SME contractors is 
even older.  “During the March 1997 meeting of the ESA Council, Ministers of ESA 
Member States called upon the Director General of ESA to reserve a special place 
for small business.  The objective is to guarantee them a share in the Agency’s 
technological activities, and to facilitate their access to technical facilities and tools” 
(ESA).  Thus, European SME policies generally address both the issue of 
opportunity to compete and, to a lesser extent, the issue of share of participation in 
public procurement through reservation of certain procurement opportunities at the 
prime contracting and subcontracting levels for SMEs (ESA). 
C.  Comparison 
Both the United States and Europe at the EU and Europe-wide agency level 
have well-established, comprehensive programs and policies on small business 
procurement assistance, and such policies are being rapidly implemented among 
the European Member States.  However, the US policies and programs are older 
and better established than the European ones.  While the US assistance measures 
for small contractors are focused on both the opportunity to participate (such as 
ensuring a transparent procurement process, providing advance notice of 
procurement opportunities, simplifying qualifications to bid, or reducing contract 
sizes) and the actual fair share of participation, the European assistance measures 
currently in place are focused more on the opportunity to participate.  This, however, 
is changing as European assistance is becoming more focused on measurable, 
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identifiable participation outcomes such as the extent of participation of SMEs in 
specific contracts.21  Although Europe historically has not required or encouraged 
set-asides to the same extent as the United States, European policies and practices 
effectively include SME participation as an element of best value.  In this way, the 
European approach is similar to the US significant evaluation factor approach in 
Federal Supply Schedule procurements.  This approach creates uncertainty as to 
whether SME participation will, at the end, carry the day and drive the award of a 
specific contract.  The European approach of requiring SME participation as a 
contract performance condition also introduces uncertainty, as such participation 
requirement can vary contract-by-contract.  Both these approaches also convey the 
appearance of a procurement system free of SME preferences, when this is not the 
case.  Nonetheless, assuming EU states will be following the EC Directives on public 
and defense procurement, it is likely that civilian and defense projects will be steered 
to European SMEs on an even greater scale.
                                            
21 See, e.g., supra, note 68; accord 2009/81/EC Defense Procurement Directive ¶¶ 20 and 21(4); 2004/18/EC 
Public Procurement Directive ¶32. 
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III.   Defining Small Business Enterprises 
One clear and obvious indication of targeted policies to assist small 
businesses in government contracting is an official, legally binding definition of a 
small business for government procurement purposes.  Both European and US 
authorities have adopted such definitions.  These definitions include criteria that are 
specific to certain jurisdictions, contracts, or agencies, as well as criteria that are 
general and applicable to the procurement system at large.    
A. The US Approach: An Industry-Sensitive Definition 
Framework  
The United States traditionally has eschewed a one-size-fits-all approach to 
defining what would be a small business for purposes of government contracting.  
Instead, the United States has generally taken into account industry-specific trends 
and conditions.  Industry trends and conditions may be reflected in varying 
measures of economic activities (e.g., employment or revenue), as well as in varying 
size caps (by revenue or numbers of employees) established for different industries 
or activities.  This diversity makes eminent sense assuming the purpose behind 
small business definitions is to target relief and assistance to those companies most 
struggling to establish themselves and most vulnerable to anti-competitive pressures 
by large businesses or government officials.  However, the objective of truly and 
accurately reflecting industry conditions is frequently in dynamic tension with the 
objective of avoiding red tape and legal uncertainty through clear and simplified 
rules.  Congress, the Small Business Administration, and various tribunals and other 
agencies have been busy balancing these objectives for close to seven decades.  In 
the Small Business Act, Congress provided that “a small business concern [...] shall 
be deemed to be one which is independently owned and operated and which is not 
dominant in the field of operation” (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 632).  Further, 
Congress gave the SBA the authority to specify, “in addition to the[ese] criteria, 
detailed definitions or standards by which a business concern may be determined to 
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be a small business concerns for the purposes [of the Small Business Act] or any 
other Act,” and generally prohibited Federal agencies from establishing their own 
small business definitions without SBA approval or separate statutory authority 
(USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 632).  The SBA’s criteria “may utilize number of 
employees, dollar volume of business, net worth, a combination thereof, or other 
appropriate factors,” but the SBA “shall ensure that the size standard varies from 
industry to industry to the extent necessary to reflect differing characteristics of the 
various industries and consider other factors determined to be relevant by the [SBA] 
Administrator” (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 632).22  The Small Business Act makes 
it “the duty” of the SBA “to determine within any industry the concerns, firms, 
persons, corporations, partnerships, cooperatives, or other business enterprises 
which are to be designated ‘small-business concerns’” and requires the SBA 
Administrator to issue upon request a revocable certificate that a concern is a small 
business (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 637(b)(6)).  Congress has generally refrained 
from establishing specific size standards by law (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 
632).23    The SBA has promulgated Small Business Size Regulations pursuant to 
this authority in Title 13, Part 121 of the Code of Federal Regulations.   
In the United States, size standards for government procurement purposes 
have changed over the years.  According to the late US Senator Leverett Saltonstall, 
a member of Congressional leadership in the 1950s (Saltonstall, 1957, January 25), 
Congress originally passed a small business definition for defense procurement 
                                            
22 Ralph Thomas (2009, February) gives a general description of the SBA’s size standards methodology: 
Generally, the size status for manufacturing industries is employee-based in that a company’s size is 
determined by calculating the average employment of the company, including the employees of its 
domestic and foreign affiliates, based on the number of persons employed on a full-time, part-time, 
temporary, or other basis, during each of the pay periods of the preceding 12 months.  For service and 
construction companies, the SBA, for the most part, uses a receipts-based standard whereby it 
determines size by averaging a firm’s annual receipts, including the receipts of its domestic and foreign 
affiliates (less returns and allowances, sales of fixed assets, and inter-affiliate transactions) for the 
previous three years.  
23 Contra USC Title 15 § 632 (2010) (setting forth a $750,000 annual receipts cap for agricultural enterprises, 
including affiliates).   
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purposes in the Selective Service Act of 1940, imposing a size cap of “500 
employees, including affiliated” (Saltonstall, 1957, January 25).24  The Selective 
Service Act of 1948 “defined a small business as one: (1) whose position in its trade 
or industry is not a dominant one; which does not have more than 500 employees; 
and (3) which is independently owned and operated,” provided that the employee 
count includes “its corporate and partnership affiliates” (Shestack & Long, 1950-
1951).25  Other Federal agencies apparently used other definitions for non-
procurement purposes.26  In 1957, the SBA extended the defense procurement 
definition with a 500-employee cap to civilian procurements (Saltonstall, 1957, 
January 25).27  Congress, however, has frequently criticized the SBA’s 500-person 
size cap applicable to all Federal contracts as too inflexible and unresponsive to the 
realities of the marketplace (US House, 1993, May 25).  The SBA decided instead to 
establish industry-specific size standards in reliance on the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) of US industries by the Census Bureau.  The SIC system 
assigned codes to industries pursuing different economic activities, and SBA 
periodically revised its SIC-based standards (US House, 1993, May 25).     
                                            
24 Saltonstall apparently refers to the industrial mobilization provisions in Section 9 of the Selective Training 
and Service Act of September 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885, formerly codified as 50 USC App. § 309 (1946).    
25 Shestack and Long cite Act of June 24th, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 18(a).  Section 18(a) of the Selective 
Service Act of 1948 was concerned  with inequitable rationing of defense contracts as well as raw materials or 
other supplies for  use in their production to large firms, and so stated that “[u]nder any such program of 
national procurement, the President shall recognize the valid claim of American small business to participate in 
such contracts, in such manufactures, and in such distribution of materials, and small business shall be granted a 
fair share of the orders placed, exclusively for the use of armed forces of for other Federal agencies [such as the 
Atomic Energy Commission] now or hereafter designated in this section.”  Comment, Utilization of Industry 
Section of the Selective Service Act of 1948, in Statutes, 24 N.Y. U. L. Q. REV. 211, 216, n. 1 (1949). 
26 For instance, by the end of 1950s, the Bureau of Census established its own definition, with the size cap 
measured to be less than 100 employees for manufacturing firms and the size of “distributing firms” measured 
based on the sales volume, while firms with less than $250,000 in assets were considered small for tax purposes 
(Saltonstall, 1957, January 25). 
27  accord Otis Steel Products Corp. v. United States, 316 F.2d 937 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (citing 13 C.F.R. § 103 (1958 
Supp.) which provided: “Determination of small business for Government procurement. — (a) General 
definition. A small business concern for the purpose of Government procurement is a concern that (1) is not 
dominant in its field of operation and, with its affiliates, employs fewer than 500 employees, or (2) is certified 
as a small business concern by SBA.”). 
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Since 1997, the SBA has abandoned the SIC system and instead has relied 
on the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) to determine the 
type of industry in which a company is participating.  NAICS was developed to 
facilitate better comparisons among industries of the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico.  According to the SBA’s Guide to Size Standards, the SBA “has established 
two widely used size standards – 500 employees for most manufacturing and mining 
industries and $7.0 million in average annual receipts for most nonmanufacturing 
industries.  However, many exceptions exist” (SBA).  Size standards generally apply 
to procurement as well as non-procurement assistance.  Common industry-specific 
size standards include: size standards ranging from $7 million to $20 million in 
average annual receipts for various industries related to construction and dredging; 
size standards capped at 750, 1,000, or 1,500 employees for certain manufacturing 
industries not subject to the 500 employee size standard; a 500 employee size 
standard for non-service mining industries; size standards ranging from $7 million to 
$29 million in average annual receipts for retail industries; size standards ranging 
from $7 million to $35.5 million in average annual receipts for most service 
industries; a 500 employee plus size standard for wholesale trade industries along 
with a generally applicable requirement that items supplied be a product of a US 
small business manufacturer (SBA).  Other industries such as finance, insurance, 
transportation, or electricity, have size standards with “no common pattern” for 
industry groups.  In addition, a few industries have additional regulatory conditions 
for purposes of government procurement programs, such as the 125,000 barrels per 
calendar day total operable atmospheric crude oil distillation capacity for petroleum 
refineries (SBA).  For purposes of pro-innovation set-aside competitions under the 
Small Business Innovation Research Program and the Small Business Technology 
Transfer Program, the size standard is 500 employees regardless of the industry in 
which the R&D work is to be conducted (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.702).  For 
purposes of the Very Small Business (VSB) Set-Aside Pilot Program in existence 
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between 1994 and 2003, the size standard was 15 employees or less and average 
annual revenues of $1 million or less.28  Detailed size standards are published in the 
SBA’s regulations and its Table of Size Standards, and they have the force and 
effect of law (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.201; GSA et al., 2010, Section 
19.102).  To accommodate the diversity of industries and programs, size standards 
have become rather complex: the Table goes on for 44 pages setting forth size 
standards in well over 1000 industry categories, while the Guide goes on for another 
17 pages.   
A business concern may be small in one industry category and yet large in 
another.  Under SBA regulations, contracting officers are responsible for choosing 
the NAICS code which best describes the “principal purpose” of the product or 
service acquired (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.402(b); GSA et al., 2010, Section 
19.102).  The basis for this decision is subject to a complex six-factor test, which 
includes: (1) “industry descriptions” in the NAICS Manual, (2) description of product 
or service in solicitation documents, (3) “value and importance” of the procurement’s 
components, (4) functions of products and services procured, (5) prior procurement 
classifications in similar purchases, and (6) the purposes of the Small Business Act 
(CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.402(b); GSA et al., 2010, Section 19.102).  A 
procurement is usually classified according to the component which accounts for the 
greatest percentage of contract value.  Despite their complexity, the US small 
business size definitions are publicly available and generally applicable to contracts 
and subcontracts across Federal agencies.   
SBA’s employee-based caps are calculated prior to each representation or 
certification of small business size based on the average number of employees for 
each pay period “over the preceding 12 months” (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 
121.106; GSA et al., 2010, Section 19.101).  Part-time or temporary employees 
                                            
28 FAR (GSA et al., 2003) Subpart 19.9, § 52.219-5 provides for set-asides of small contracts for very small 
businesses within certain geographic areas. 
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count the same as full-time employees (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.106; GSA 
et al., 2010, Section 19.101).  Total average employees of all entities considered 
affiliated with the enterprise which have been employed by those affiliates over the 
preceding 12-month period (even if affiliation arose more recently) are included in 
the count (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.106; GSA et al., 2010, Section 19.101).  
There is no official definition of a “medium-sized business” in the United States for 
procurement purposes.29     
In addition to assuring predictability and transparency in small business 
definitions, Congress and the SBA have established a panoply of safeguards to 
protect the US small business size definitions from fraud and manipulation.  These 
safeguards include not only publicly available and legally binding definitions, but also 
the process to appeal the NAICS designations for individual contracts (CFR, 2010, 
Title 13, Section 121.1101, 1102); the process to protest to the SBA a company’s 
representation that it is a small business (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.1001-
1101); the regulations concerning affiliation with large businesses and ostensible 
subcontracting with large businesses (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103;30 
regulations concerning recertification of former small business which became large 
                                            
29 Cf. CFR § 296.2) (2010) (providing that criteria for a medium-sized business definition in the US Department 
of Commerce Technology Innovation Program will be determined by reference to the total revenues of the 
1000th company on the Fortune 1000 list). 
30 The “ostensible subcontractor rule” was recently described by the SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals 
(2006, October 17) as follows: 
The ostensible subcontractor rule is an independent basis for finding affiliation between two concerns. 
13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h)(4). The purpose of the rule is to prevent other than small firms from forming 
relationships with small firms to evade SBA's size requirements. The ostensible subcontractor rule 
permits the Area Office to determine a subcontractor and a prime have formed a joint venture (and are 
thus affiliates) for determining size. An ostensible subcontractor is a subcontractor that performs 
primary and vital requirements of a contract or a subcontractor upon which the prime contractor is 
unusually reliant. 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h)(4). In determining whether a subcontractor performs primary 
and vital requirements or that the prime is unusually reliant, the Area Office must consider all aspects 
of the prime-subcontractor relationship including, but not limited to, the terms of the proposal, 
agreements between the prime and the subcontractor (such as teaming agreements), and whether the 
subcontractor is an incumbent contractor and is ineligible to submit a proposal because it exceeds the 
size requirements for the solicitation. 
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through growth, mergers, or acquisitions;31 prohibition on subcontracting the majority 
of the work on small business set-asides to large businesses, known as “limitations 
on subcontracting” (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 644(o); GSA et al., 2010, Section 
52.219-14); and criminal and civil penalties for misrepresentation of small business 
size (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 645(d)).  Individual Federal agencies generally 
cannot, on their own, adjust small business size or status requirements or 
safeguards such as the limitation on subcontracting for individual contracts.32    
Perhaps the most important policy safeguards against manipulation of small 
business definitions in the US procurement system are the SBA’s rules limiting 
affiliation of small business concerns with other businesses.  In particular, the SBA 
affiliation regulations in Title 13, Section 121.103 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
provide that “concerns and entities are affiliates of the other when one controls or 
has the power to control the other, or a third party or parties controls or has the 
power to control both.  It does not matter whether control is exercised, as long as the 
power to control exists” (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  Affiliation is 
determined based on totality-of-the-circumstances basis, relevant factors include not 
only ownership, but also management, prior relationships, indirect ties through third 
parties, and contractual relationships (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  
Affiliation may be found based on negative control, which includes “instances where 
a minority shareholder has the ability, under the concern’s charter, bylaws, or 
shareholders’ agreement, to prevent a quorum or otherwise block action by the 
board of directors or shareholders” (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  
Affiliation may be found even where no single factor by itself would create affiliation 
(CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  Thus, affiliation restrictions are drawn to be 
intentionally broad in order to serve as catch-all for schemes to manipulate small 
business programs.     
                                            
31 See 71 Fed. Reg. 66434-66444 (Nov. 15, 2006). 
32 See, e.g. Centech Group v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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SBA affiliation regulations (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103) illustrate 
seven categories of affiliation.  The first category is affiliation based on stock 
ownership.  Control here is found where a person or entity “owns, or has the power 
to control, 50 percent or more of a concern's voting stock, or a block of voting stock 
which is large compared to other outstanding blocks of voting stock,” and rebuttable 
presumption of control is created where two or more persons or entities who are 
holding minority voting stakes “and such minority holdings are equal or 
approximately equal in size, and the aggregate of these minority holdings is large as 
compared with any other stock holding” (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  
Where the “voting stock is widely held and no single block of stock is large as 
compared with all other stock holdings, the concern's Board of Directors and CEO or 
President will be deemed to have the power to control the concern in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary” (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  The second 
category is affiliation arising under stock options, convertible securities, and merger 
agreements.  In these circumstances, affiliation is determined based on the “present 
effect of the power to control the concern” even if the power has not yet been 
exercised (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  The third category is affiliation 
based on common management, which arises in cases of interlocking officers, 
directors, partners, or other management (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  
The fourth category is affiliation based on identity of interest.  In these 
circumstances, regulations create a rebuttable presumption of affiliation where 
persons or firms have the same or “substantially identical” business lines, common 
investments, or mutual economic dependencies through contractual or other 
relationships (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  The fifth category is affiliation 
based on involvement of key employees of one concern in another, newly organized 
concern.  The SBA regulations create a rebuttable presumption of affiliation where 
there are interlocking key employees, shareholders, or managers, both concerns are 
in related industries, and one concern is providing substantial financial or technical 
assistance to another (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  The sixth category is 
affiliation based on joint ventures and ostensible subcontracting.  Joint ventures are 
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associations of persons or companies that pool together their resources for specific 
business undertakings, and make no more than 3 proposals over a 2-year period.  
Joint venturers are generally considered affiliated, unless they are subject to 
exceptions such as mentor-protégé arrangements between small and large firms, 
small disadvantaged firms admitted in the Section 8(a) Business Development 
program and large firms, or unless the joint venture is bidding or proposing on a 
contract that is so large or complex that it is considered “bundled” under SBA 
regulations (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 121.103).  This category also includes a 
rule treating a prime contractor and an ostensible subcontractor joint venturers and 
affiliates if a prime contractor is unusually reliant on an ostensible subcontractor, if 
that subcontractor performs primary and vital functions of the contract, or if the 
contract was a set-aside and that subcontractor was previously an incumbent and 
was ineligible to bid or propose for the set-aside (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 
121.103).  The final, seventh category is affiliation based on franchise and license 
agreements.  Any such agreements which give the franchisor profit rights and loss 
risks incident to ownership would result in affiliation (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 
121.103).     
The SBA affiliation regulations also provide seven exceptions from affiliation.  
These exceptions include business concerns owned wholly or partially by the SBA-
regulated Small Business Investment Companies; business concerns owned and 
controlled by Indian tribes, Alaska Native Corporations, Native Hawaiian 
Organizations, or Federally-assisted Community Development Corporations; 
business concerns which participate in SBA-approved R&D pools; business 
concerns which lease employees or which obtain employees from Professional 
Employer Organizations (PEOs); for certain types of assistance, business concerns 
with outside investors that are venture capital operating companies, employee 
benefit or pension plans, charitable trusts and foundations, and certain types of 
investment companies; mentor large businesses under Federal Mentor-Protégé 
programs for small contractors; and small agricultural cooperatives (CFR, 2010, Title 
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13, Section 121.103).   Under recent amendments to SBA regulations related to the 
Small Business Innovation Research Program and small business procurement 
programs, venture capital ownership of 49% or less would not, by itself, create 
affiliation (SBA, 2007, October 18).  Moreover, business concerns majority-owned by 
venture capital companies which themselves are owned and controlled by individual 
US citizens or permanent residents may still be considered small as long as all 
affiliates have less than 500 employees (SBA, 2007, October 18).  All these 
exceptions are rather straightforward.  In contrast, the affiliation restrictions are 
subject to greater SBA discretion.   
B. The European Approach: A User-Friendly Definition 
Framework  
European nations have had a variety of SME size standards or definitions.  
However, within the EU framework, the European Commission is responsible for 
promulgating a definition applicable to EU activities.  The Commission’s definitions 
of SMEs are not legally binding on Member States (EC Directorate).  Prior to 1996, 
the EU SME definition corresponded to the traditional US size standard cap of 500 
employees (Storey, 2003, p. 477).  However, since 1996, the Commission has 
adopted two recommendations concerning SME definitions: Commission 
Recommendation 96/280/EC of April 3, 1996, and Commission Recommendation 
2003/361/EC of May 6, 2003, which became effective on January 1, 2005 (EC 
Directorate).33  The latest definition applies to EU agencies and programs, such as 
the European Defense Agency, and EU Members States are invited to use it (EC 
Directorate; EDA).  ESA also follows this definition (ESA).  The EU definitions are 
also used in the EEA area, for example, in Switzerland (Swiss Confederation, 2009, 
May).   
                                            
33 The New SME Definition: User Guide and Model Declaration (EC Directorate, ?) cites Commission 
Recommendation 96/280/EC Concerning the Definition of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, O.J. (L 107) 4-
9 (April 30, 1996), and Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC Concerning Micro, Small, and Medium-
Sized Enterprises, O.J. (L 124/36) 36-41 (May 20, 2003)). 
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The 2003 EC Recommendation establishes “staff headcounts and financial 
ceilings determining [three] enterprise categories”: SMEs (or “micro, small, and 
medium-sized enterprises”), small enterprises, and microenterprises.  SMEs are 
“made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an 
annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total 
not exceeding EUR 43 million.”  Small enterprises are those that employ less than 
50 persons, with an annual turnover and/or balance sheet not exceeding EUR 10 
million.  Microenterprises are those that employ less than 10 people, with an annual 
turnover and/or balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 2 million.  According to the 
European Central Bank’s 2009 data, this represents dollar-based ceilings worth 
approximately $71 million in annual turnover and/or an annual balance sheet worth 
approximately $61 million for SMEs, of $14 million for small enterprises, and of $3 
million for microenterprises (ECB).34  According to the New SME Definition User 
Guide, “annual turnover is determined by calculating the income that your enterprise 
received during the year in question for sales and services after all rebates have 
been paid out,” not including value-added and other indirect taxes, while “the annual 
balance sheet refers to the value of your company’s assets” (EC Directorate).   
Employees are calculated in “annual work units” (AWUs), a concept that parallels 
the American concept of full-time equivalents (FTEs.)  As a result, part-time and 
seasonal workers are included in the calculation as parts of AWUs.  However, time 
spent on paternity or maternity leave is not counted.  Employees, active partners, 
managing owners, and employees “of subordinate enterprises” who are considered 
employees under national laws of EU Member States are also included in the AWU 
calculation.  On the other hand, apprentices or vocational training students are not 
included in the count (EC Directorate).        
It is important to note that not all EU Member States follow the EC definition.  
For instance, the UK, a country with a large and well-established procurement 
                                            
34 Establishing a rate of $1.4268 per 1 Euro. 
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system, currently appears to target its procurement assistance “for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with up to 500 employees” (UK Office). 
The 2003 EU definition contains several protections against manipulation and 
circumvention by large businesses.  However, in comparison with the 1996 EU 
definition, these protections have been relaxed in order to enable companies to 
attract outside financing.35  Anti-manipulation and anti-circumvention measures 
under the 2003 definition include rules governing affiliation with SMEs of other 
business entities, natural persons, universities, venture capitalists and business 
angels, and even government authorities.  The affiliation rules draw a distinction 
between three types of SMEs: autonomous, partner, and linked enterprises.  
Employees and financials from linked and partner enterprises are added to the count 
of the company declaring itself an SME to determine whether that company is, in 
fact, an SME.  Generally, an enterprise is considered autonomous if it: “does not 
have a holding of 25 percent or more in any other enterprise; is not 25% or more 
owned by any enterprise or public body or jointly by several linked enterprises or 
public bodies . . . and does not draw up consolidated accounts and is not included in 
the accounts of an enterprise which draws up consolidated accounts and is thus not 
a linked enterprise” (EC, 2003, May 6, Section 1).  For example, an enterprise where 
the owner accepted three investors at 20% each would be considered autonomous if 
these investors are not linked to each other.36  A partner enterprise “represents the 
situation of enterprises which establish major financial relationships with other 
enterprises, without the one exercising direct or indirect control over the other,” i.e. 
where an enterprise “has a holding or voting rights equal to or greater than 25% in 
the other enterprise” or the holdings are reversed, and the enterprises are not 
considered linked through consolidated accounts or voting rights in excess of 50% 
                                            
35 Compare Commission Recommendation Concerning the Definition of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(EC, 1996, April 3) with Commission Recommendation Concerning Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises  (EC, 2003, May 6). 
36 Cf. EC New SME Definition Guide (EC Directorate). 
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(EC Directorate).  Finally, enterprises are considered linked if “enterprises form a 
group through the direct or indirect control of the majority of the voting rights 
(including through agreements, or in certain cases, through natural persons acting 
as shareholders) or through the ability to exercise a dominant influence on an 
enterprise” (EC Directorate).  A partner enterprise must include the percentages of 
employees or financials of upstream and downstream partner enterprises (together 
with any upstream or downstream enterprises with which they are linked) in 
proportion to the percentage of the holdings.  Data from partners of partner 
enterprises one step removed is not included.  On the other hand, linked enterprises 
must include all employees and financials of all linked upstream or downstream 
enterprises, as well as data from their partners.  
However, the 2003 EU definition contains a number of exceptions.  Public 
investment corporations, venture capital companies, business angels investing up to 
EUR 1.25 million, universities, non-profit research centers, institutional investors, 
including mutual funds and regional development funds, and autonomous local 
authorities with annual budget of below EUR 10 million and less than 5,000 
inhabitants, may all each invest up to 50% into an enterprise without the enterprise 
losing its autonomous SME status.  These investors are prohibited from being 
involved in management, but may otherwise exercise shareholder rights.  In such 
circumstances, the 2003 EC definition provides for a presumption that dominance 
does not exists.  Unless there is linking between investors’ enterprises or linking 
through natural persons that involved operations in the markets that are the same, 
directly upstream, or directly downstream, there would be no linking of the SME with 
investors under the 2003 EC definition.    
Separately, the European SME Code encourages SMEs to invoke Article 
47(2) of the Public Procurement Directive, which authorizes contractors “where 
appropriate and for a particular contract, [to] rely on the capacities of other entities, 
regardless of the legal nature of the links it has with them.”  This policy could be 
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viewed as authorizing ostensible subcontractor-type arrangements with large 
businesses.  
Further, the apparent clarity and predictability of the EU definition is obviated 
by the absence of mandatory size enforcement process and by the language 
granting safe harbor to companies declaring themselves SMEs “even if the capital is 
spread in such a way that it is not possible to determine by whom it is held” (EC, 
2003, May 20).  The European Commission permits such a company to “declare in 
good faith that it can legitimately presume that it is not owned as to 25% or more by 
one enterprise or jointly by enterprises linked to another” (EC, 2003, May 20).  Such 
declarations, however, may be challenged in the course of “check and 
investigations” under separate EU or Member State laws or rules (EC, 2003, May 
20).  
C. Comparison 
In terms of public policy objectives, Europe appears to emphasize user-
friendliness, clarity, simplicity in its SME definitions.  This is particularly true with 
regards to concerns related to affiliation with other entities: a European contracting 
official or SME owner could, by consulting The New SME Definition Guide, easily 
determine whether or not an enterprise in question is a large business by affiliation.  
This is a substantial advantage in the administration of small business assistance 
measures.  However, it would be hard to argue that this one-size-fits-all approach is 
a genuine reflection of conditions in the industries in which small firms have to 
compete.  Accordingly, SME-specific assistance in Europe could simultaneously be 
denied to deserving firms in some industries and extended to firms which would be 
considered large under an industry-specific analysis in other industries.  On the 
other hand, the complexity of the US small business size standards is somewhat of 
a necessary evil because it reflects considerations of industry-specific conditions 
and fair competition among similarly situated firms in the same industries.   
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In terms of the absolute measures of size, the competitive impact of 
assistance based on these definitions is hard to estimate across the board.  For 
example, the UK apparently still uses the 500-employee definition in some 
circumstances, equivalent to the traditional American standard.  The EU has the 
larger size caps across all industries in general, while America has the larger overall 
size caps in some of its industries.  Thus, while competitive impact will be 
determined on an industry-by-industry basis, US services firms would be generally 
disadvantaged by the EU SME definition while US manufacturers should be favored 
by it.  Moreover, the European definition favors jobs-creation more than the US 
definition.  This is because the underlying mathematics used in calculating 
employee-based size caps is not same across the Atlantic.  One AWU/FTE-based 
European employee can equal several US employees based on counting rules in the 
SBA regulations.  As a result, an US R&D or manufacturer firm with 100 full-time 
employees and another 600 employees working only a quarter of an FTE each 
would be the economic equivalent of a European enterprise employing 250 AWU 
employees.  As a matter of SBA regulations, such US firm would bust even the 
supposedly higher 500-employee US size standards for R&D or manufacturers by 
200 employees, would be branded a large business, and would be denied 
procurement assistance or preferences under the Small Business Act.  The US firm 
appears to be a giant almost 3 times larger than the European firm, but this 
appearance is false.  In reality, the two firms have the same size as measured by 
full-time employment.  Had such US firm relocated to Europe, it would still have 
qualified for SME-specific procurement measures.  By using the AWU/FTE method, 
Europeans enable their SMEs to create more jobs than US firms before the 
European SMEs are forced to compete as large businesses.     
The supposed advantages for US small businesses in industries with 
relatively high size standards lose their luster even more once the US and the EU 
definitions are compared for protections against manipulation and fraud are 
considered.  In comparison with the US small business size standard system, the 
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European definition does not sufficiently protect independence of ownership or 
operation of SMEs, and is highly vulnerable to fraud and manipulation by large 
businesses or investor government agencies.  First, the European affiliation and 
anti-circumvention rules plainly allow companies that are majority-owned by large 
businesses and government agencies to qualify as autonomous SMEs as long as 
each such investor owned less than 25%.  Indeed, based on examples throughout 
The New SME Definition Guide, an SME would be considered merely partnered if a 
large business owned just under 50% and two other large businesses owned 
between 20% and 25% each.  Second, negative control affiliation is not recognized 
under the EU definition; instead, the EU definition contains what appears to be a 
legal presumption that minority shareholders do not control an SME.  These policies 
further tilt the competitive field towards Europe over the United States by opening 
the doors to large business manipulation of European SME procurement assistance 
measures.  Third, the European affiliation rules for partner enterprises exclude the 
majority of their employees from the count of the enterprise claiming SME status.  
The integrity of the definition is stronger in the United States, where SBA affiliation 
rules require adding all employees of all affiliated firms.  Fourth, the EC imposed no 
requirements that an SME perform the majority of the work on a public contract or 
subcontract, or provide supplies manufactured by an SME.  In addition, the EC does 
not require a formal size protest mechanism, companies may declare their SME 
status claiming “in good faith” lack of knowledge of their own ownership, and the 
2003 EC Recommendation says nothing about whether the European authorities 
would aggressively pursue criminal or civil fraud enforcement of SME size fraud.   
Thus, from the US perspective, there is a real risk that European programs for 
SMEs, such as R&D set-asides, will operate as mere domestic preferences for 
European firms regardless of size.    
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IV. Creation of Small Business Procurement 
Assistance Agencies 
To assist small firms with accessing public procurement markets, both 
European and US authorities created specialized government institutions.  These 
institutions not only provide financing and technical assistance counseling to the 
private sector, but they also engage their sister agencies in efforts to expand 
procurement opportunities to small firms.  However, these institutions appear to be 
more independent in the United States.  
A. The US Approach: An Independent, Central Small 
Business Advocate and Regulator  
Beginning with the World War II era, the US government intensified its efforts 
to assist small firms with tapping the federal procurement market.  As part of this 
effort, the government legislated several times the establishment of a special agency 
to assist small firms with government contracts and related financial and technical 
development assistance: the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (1932), which was 
created by President Herbert Hoover as a financing agency and acquired contracting 
responsibilities following World War II; the Smaller War Plants Corporation (1942), 
which was created by Congress with the passage of the Small Business Mobilization 
Act37 (US Congress, 1942, June 11); the Small Defense Plants Administration 
(1952); and, finally, the Small Business Administration (SBA) (1953) (Saltonstall, 
1957, January 25).38  An independent Federal agency with Presidentially-appointed, 
Senate-confirmed Administrator and Deputy Administrator, the SBA “shall be under 
the general direction and supervision of the President and shall not be affiliated with 
or be within any other agency or department of the Federal Government” (USC, 
                                            
37 Formerly codified at 50A USC §§1101-1109. 
38 Accord  SBA Overview and History. 
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2010, Section 633(a)).  To further enhance the SBA’s independent voice with 
regards to complaints of small businesses, regulatory relief, and studies of small 
business programs (including government contracting programs), Congress created 
within the SBA a special Office of Advocacy lead by the Presidentially-appointed, 
Senate confirmed Chief Counsel for Advocacy (USC, 2010, Section 634a-634g).  
Indeed, President Eisenhower, the father of the SBA, observed that the agency had 
to work “[j]ointly with the Department of Defense and with other Federal departments 
and agencies” as it “assist[ed] small concerns in obtaining government procurement 
contracts” (Eisenhower, 1956, June 1).  Nonetheless, the SBA has been endowed 
with powers not only to engage in cooperative intergovernmental efforts (USC, 2010, 
Section 631a(a)), but also to promulgate regulations binding on private individuals 
and other agencies (USC, 2010, Section 634).  The SBA has issued numerous 
regulations concerning small business contracting and subcontracting, generally 
found in Title 13, Chapters 101, 115, 121, 124, 125, 126, and 127 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations.      
In addition, the SBA has been directed by the Small Business Act (USC, 
2010, Section 644) to designate Procurement Center Representatives (PCRs) (as 
well as Breakout Procurement Center Representatives (BPCRs), and other 
personnel) for oversight of major buying activities of the government, including:  
reviewing proposed acquisitions and recommending alternative procurement 
strategies; identifying qualified small business sources; reviewing 
subcontracting plans; conducting reviews of the contracting office to ensure 
compliance with small business policies; counseling small businesses; and 
sponsoring and participating in conferences and training  designed to 
increase small business opportunities. (Executive Office et al., 2002, October 
29)    
To emphasize the importance of advocacy for small business within 
government agencies, the Small Business Act also directed that each Federal 
agency with contracting authority must establish the Office of Small and 
Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU), with the director reporting to the head 
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of the agency (Executive Office et al., 2002, October 29).  OSDBUs are “responsible 
for ensuring that small businesses have the maximum practicable opportunity to 
participate in the performance of federal contracts as both prime contractors and 
subcontractors” (Executive Office et al., 2002, October 29).  OSDBU offices are 
required by law to closely work with the SBA (USC, 2010, Section 634).  OSDBUs 
coordinate their efforts through participation in a voluntary Federal OSDBU Director 
Interagency Council and in the formal Federal Small Business Procurement Advisory 
Council, chaired by the SBA Deputy Administrator (US Congress, 1994; Denett, 
2008, March 6).  OSDBUs in Federal agencies are responsible for implementing not 
only the Small Business Act but also agency-specific small business procurement 
statutes, such as the space- and defense-related small business goaling, set-aside, 
preference, and incentive authorities in Title 10, Sections 2323 and 2323a of the 
United States Code.   Such agency-specific authorities generally enhance the 
policies of the Small Business Act.  
Finally, small business procurement initiatives are promoted and supported 
through the White House Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP).  The OFPP 
is charged by its authorizing statute with developing policies that would help Federal 
agencies achieve their small business goals and would ensure “maximum 
practicable opportunities” for small business participation in small-dollar 
procurements (USC, 2010, Title 41, Section 405).39  The OFPP is also required to 
promulgate uniform procurement regulations for the Federal government (known as 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation) and to consult the SBA concerning the impact of 
such regulations on small businesses (USC, 2010, Title 41, Section 405a).  Among 
other measures to promote small business, the OFPP established the position of the 
Deputy Administrator “with responsibility for small business contracting to ensure 
appropriate and consistent senior level attention on small business matters” as well 
                                            
39 The Small Business Act also charges OFPP with responsibilities for attaining small business goals (USC, Title 
15, Section 644(g)(1)). 
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as “a Small Business Team to focus on small business regulatory issues in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of regulatory development for small business issues through improved coordination 
and communication between SBA and the FAR regulatory drafters” (Denett, 2008, 
March 6).     
B. The European Approach: Centralized Advocacy, Varied 
National Implementation 
European efforts to create public authorities specifically charged with directing 
various forms of procurement assistance have been relatively recent – but they are 
at least as comprehensive as similar efforts in America, if not more.  In Europe, 
small business procurement policies are developed and implemented at three 
different levels: the European Union level; the level of non-EU European agencies or 
institutions; and the level of individual EU members, including both national and 
subnational authorities.  At the EU level, small business procurement policy is 
handled by the European Commission, including its Enterprise & Industry 
Directorate-General, the European Defense Agency (EDA), and the Community 
Research & Development Information Service (CORDIS).  The EI Directorate-
General is responsible for initiatives to support the growth and development of small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs).  Its comprehensive efforts for small business 
procurement began with the Green Paper, Public Procurement in the European 
Union: Exploring the Way Forward, published November 27, 1996 (EC, 1996, 
November 27).  Following the paper’s publication, the European Commission took 
official action on small business procurement by issuing Commission 
Communication COM (98) 143 final, Public Procurement in the European Union, on 
March 11, 1998 (EC, 1998b, March 11).  However, the European-level activities to 
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promote small business procurement have been historically limited to promoting 
regulatory simplification and fairness in cross-border trade.40     
To enhance SME participation in policy-making at the EU level, the EC 
created a special position of SME Envoy with the rank of the Deputy Director-
General of the EC Directorate-General of Enterprise and Industry.  The SME Envoy 
promotes the “Think Small First” strategies for public procurement, state aid to 
enterprises, and R&D activities (embodied in a guidebook by the same title) in 
activities of EU and Member State agencies (EC Directorate of Enterprise).   
European agencies and institutions which are, strictly speaking, not part of 
the EU structure have also created or adopted procurement policies in support of 
SMEs.  One example is the European Space Agency (ESA), which is an 
international organization dedicated “to the development of Europe’s space 
capability” (ESA). as well as to “political efforts to forge a united Europe” and to 
“building Europe as a political entity” (Petrou, 2008, pp. 143-144, notes 7, 8).41   The 
ESA’s ruling Council includes 19 states, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom, while Hungary, Romania, and Poland participate in ESA activities under a 
special agreement for European countries.  The ESA created an SME Policy Office, 
which “manages and coordinates, ESA-wide, application of the SME Policy” and “put 
in place a number of measures to reinforce the technical capabilities and 
sustainability of high technology SMEs in order to facilitate their involvement in ESA 
activities” such as set-asides and subcontracting clauses (ESA).   
                                            
40 See supra, note 36. 
41 Petrou cites remarks by former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Kohl. 
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A somewhat different approach was undertaken by the European Free Trade 
Association.  There, the relatively generalist EFTA Surveillance Authority monitors 
SME-specific assistance measures (European Free, 2008, June 30).  A similar 
approach - assigning SME responsibilities to a generalist organization - is 
undertaken by the European Defense Agency.  There, SME assistance is the focus 
of the Industry and Market Directorate as part of its responsibilities for enhancement 
of the European defense industrial base (EDA).    
In light of both the EU’s traditionally limited involvement in small business 
procurement and the EU’s recent drive to increase such involvement, EU nations 
and their subnational units created their own individual small business procurement 
authorities.  For instance, procurement-related assistance to SMEs in the United 
Kingdom is a responsibility of both the Small Business Service (SBS) within the 
Department of Trade and Industry (currently the Department of Business, 
Innovation, and Skills), and its Office of Government Commerce (OGC) within the 
Department of the Treasury.  The mission of the SBS, created in 2000, is to facilitate 
business start-ups and development, while the OGC’s strives “to achieve effective 
competition for government business by simplifying access to the government 
market place” (UK Small, 2004, November).  As part of their mission, both agencies 
“let the small business community know where to find government opportunities, and 
make sure that small businesses receive equal treatment when competing for 
contracts” (UK Small, 2004, November).  Concerns have been raised that the SBS 
“lacked the power and influence required to really give small business a voice at the 
heart of Government,” but the British Government further diminished SBS powers 
and folded it within the DTI/DBIS (Politics.co.uk).  While the SBS successor, 
DTI/DBIS Enterprise Directorate “retains policy responsibility” for SME procurement 
assistance (UK Department), OGC is also responsible for “helping achieve delivery 
of further Government policy goals, including innovation, equality, and support for 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs)” (UK Office).  
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C. Comparison 
Formal offices or agencies responsible for small business procurement 
assistance have been widely established in the United States and in Europe.  US 
arrangements for such offices have emphasized their specialization in matters 
unique to small business, relative independence, direct reporting to top decision-
makers such as the President or agency Secretaries, and oversight powers.  
European arrangements, on the other hand, have emphasized the substantive 
relationship between small business procurement assistance and other policies, 
such as innovation or development of domestic industries.  Independence and direct 
reporting to top leadership have not been emphasized.  As a result, European small 
business programs have the potential to be driven by non-small business concerns. 
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V. Availability of Suitable Contracts  
In the context of public procurement, one of the threshold issues for small 
businesses is the ability to access contracts suitable to the business capabilities of 
such enterprises.  It goes without saying that such work must be, in fact, available.  
Whether suitable work is available depends on the size or monetary value of 
contracts, and, to a lesser extent, on the complexity of geographic and performance 
requirements.  Both US and European authorities have pursued limitations on 
contract awards in order to assure their suitability for small firms.  These approaches 
have a common “good government” concern over fairness and equality of 
competition, but there are also many differences.  
A. The US Approach: Addressing Contract Bundling and 
Consolidation 
As early as the 1940s and 50s, Congressional leadership recognized that 
contract bundling, or “the size of various procurements,” was an obstacle to the entry 
of small firms into the federal market (Saltonstall, 1957, January 25).42  During the 
same time period, the Executive Branch undertook several initiatives to reduce 
contract size on its own.  For instance, in the early years of World War II, the 
National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) sought “[b]roader distribution of war 
contracts” to small businesses “by allowing subcontracting, split bidding, and joint 
bidding” (NDAC, 1940, August 14, par. 21,042.10).  After World War II, the 
Executive Branch announced the “regionization program” of the General Services 
Administration (GSA), under which GSA regional offices would break down the 
government’s regional requirements into small lots (Shestack & Long, 1950-1951, 
pp. 426, 434).  This program enabled small businesses to compete for small lots or 
even for parts of small lots, and it enabled local small manufacturers to take 
                                            
42 Saltonstall calls for multiple awards to smaller firms instead of awards based on a single large bid. 
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advantage of the transportation savings (Shestack & Long, 1950-1951, pp. 426, 
434).     Today, FAR Part 19 directs contracting officers to ensure equitable 
opportunity for small firms by dividing “proposed acquisitions of supplies and 
services (except construction) into reasonably small lots (not less than economic 
production runs) to permit offers on quantities less than the total requirement” (GSA 
et al., 2010, Section 19.202-1).43 
Legislative policy aimed at reducing contract bundling was, in effect, enacted 
into law by the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984.44  Interpreting CICA, 
the Comptroller General opined that bundling of contract requirements in excess of 
the agency’s minimum needs to have the requirements performed together violated 
CICA’s requirement for full and open competition.45  CICA anti-bundling protections 
apply both to large and small firms, and bundling in violation of CICA is 
impermissible even if the requirements are bundled in a small business set-aside 
contract that excludes smaller small businesses (qualified under a NAICS code with 
a smaller size standard cap) in favor of larger small businesses (qualified under a 
NAICS code with a larger size standard cap).46      
Finally, Congressional anti-bundling policy was explicitly enacted into law by 
the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, which amended the Small Business 
Act at Title 15, Section 632(o) of the United States Code.47 The Small Business Act 
defined contract bundling to mean “consolidating two or more procurement 
requirements for goods or services previously provided or performed under 
                                            
43 There is a disagreement within the Executive Branch as to whether partial small business set-asides resulting 
from severability of contracts into lots can be implemented in multiple-award contracts or services contracts 
(see Acquistion, 2007, January, p. 299, note 116). 
44 See Public Law No. 98-369 (1984), codified for defense agencies in USC Title 10 §§2304 and 2305) (2010), 
and for civilian agencies in USC Title 41 § 253 (2010). 
45 See, e.g., Pacific Sky Supply, B-228049, 87-2 CPD ¶ 504 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 23, 1987); Phoenix Scientific 
Corporation, B-286817, 2001 CPD ¶ 24 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 22, 2001). 
46 See Vantex Service Corp., B-290415, 2002 CPD ¶ 131 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 8, 2002).  
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separate, smaller contracts, in a solicitation of offers for a single contract that is 
unlikely to be suitable for award to small business.”48   
The Act called on the agencies to pay particular attention to factors “that 
might cause unsuitability for award to small business,” such as “the diversity, size, or 
specialized nature” of performance called for in the contract, the total dollar value of 
the contract, the geographic spread of performance, or a combination of these 
factors (USC, 1998, Title 15, Section 632(o)).  To reduce contract bundling and the 
resulting denial of opportunities for small firms, the Act directed “each federal 
department and agency, to the maximum extent practicable, to: (1) structure 
contracting requirements to facilitate competition by and among small business 
concerns, taking all reasonable steps to eliminate obstacles to their participation; 
and (2) avoid unnecessary and unjustified bundling of contract requirements that 
may preclude small business participation in procurements as prime contractors” 
(USC, 1998, Title 15, Section 632(o)).  Contracts set-aside for small businesses are 
not considered bundled under the Small Business Act. 
In 2002, then-President George W. Bush placed a renewed emphasis on 
reducing contract sizes with his Small Business Agenda and one of its major 
                                                                                                                                       
47 Pub. L. No. 105-135 (1997), codified in USC Title 15 § 632(o) (1998).  This law was cited as legislative 
authority on p. 2 of the Contract Bundling Report (OFPP, 2002, October 29). 
48 The Contract Bundling Report (OFPP, 2002, October 29, p. 2) cites USC Title 15 § 632(o) (1998).  
Specifically, Title 15, Section 632(o) of the United States Code provides the following definitions: 
(1) Bundled contract.  The term "bundled contract" means a contract that is entered into to meet 
requirements that are consolidated in a bundling of contract requirements.  (2) Bundling of contract 
requirements.  The term "bundling of contract requirements" means consolidating 2 or more 
procurement requirements for goods or services previously provided or performed under separate 
smaller contracts into a solicitation of offers for a single contract that is likely to be unsuitable for 
award to a small-business concern due to - (A) the diversity, size, or specialized nature of the elements 
of the performance specified; (B) the aggregate dollar value of the anticipated award; (C) the 
geographical dispersion of the contract performance sites; or (D) any combination of the factors 
described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). (3) Separate smaller contract. The term "separate smaller 
contract", with respect to a bundling of contract requirements, means a contract that has been 
performed by 1 or more small business concerns or was suitable for award to 1 or more small business 
concerns. 
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elements, the Initiative Against Contract Bundling.  This Initiative was driven not only 
by social goals, but also by economic and “good government” goals.  At the core, the 
President’s interest in reducing the size of contracts was grounded in his vision to 
create “The Ownership Society” (Bush, 2002, March 19).49  Kicking off his Small 
Business Agenda in the speech at the Women’s Entrepreneurship Summit in 
Washington, DC, President Bush underscored the centrality of the social element to 
small business contracting: “I believe—I know government contracting, if wisely 
done, can help us achieve a grand national goal, which is more ownership in more 
communities all across America” (Bush, 2002, March 19).  According to President 
Bush, the achievement of that goal rested on making the government contracting 
system “more fair to small businesses” by combating the “effective exclu[sion]” of 
small firms due to “massive requirements” of contracting agencies (Bush, 2002, 
March 19).  At the same time, the President’s Small Business Agenda emphasized 
that small businesses provide outstanding economic benefits such as innovation and 
savings to the taxpayers 
(www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/smallbusiness/taxpayer.html).     
By October 2002, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy responded to the 
President’s direction by preparing a report entitled Contract Bundling: A Strategy for 
Increasing Federal Contracting Opportunities for Small Business (hereafter the 
Contract Bundling Report) (OFPP, 2002, October 29).  The Contract Bundling 
Report listed additional considerations in favor of reducing contract size so that more 
work would be available to small firms.  The Report made clear that rampant 
contract bundling and poor implementation of the 1997 anti-bundling legislation hurt 
both the Federal government and America’s small business sector during the 1990s:  
Although contract bundling can serve a useful purpose, the effect of this 
increase in contract bundling over the past ten years cannot be 
underestimated.  Not only are substantially fewer small businesses receiving 
                                            
49 “Small business ownership is the great equalizer in America” (Bush, 2002, March 19).  
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federal contracts, but the federal government is suffering from a reduced 
supplier base.  American small businesses bring innovation, creativity, 
competition, and lower costs to the federal table.  When these businesses are 
excluded from federal opportunities through contract bundling, our agencies, 
small businesses, and the taxpayers lose. (Styles, 2002, October 29) 
The Contract Bundling Report cited statistics that demonstrated the severe 
anti-competitive effect of bundling on the viability of the federal contractor base.  
Thus, according to the data from the SBA Office of Advocacy cited in the Report,  
for every 100 ‘bundled’ contracts, 106 individual contracts are no longer 
available to small businesses.  For every $100 awarded on a ‘bundled’ 
contract, there is a $33 decrease to small businesses.  Because these types 
of contracts ‘run longer and encompass a greater scope, competition is 
reduced in terms of frequency and the number of opportunities.’ (OFPP, 
2002, October 29, pp. 3-4) 
The Report also documented “[a] sharp overall decline in new contract awards” to 
small business even though the total small business dollars remained relatively 
constant (OFPP, 2002, October 29, p. 4).  Other trends discussed in the report 
included a significant drop in the number of small businesses receiving Federal 
contracts and growth of orders under existing contracts, especially multiple award 
schedule contracts and other task order contracts, which have been widely 
considered as sheltered from small business considerations (OFPP, 2002, October 
29, p. 4).   At the same time, the Report acknowledged that the anti-bundling 
strategy “must recognize the combined challenges and benefits of a reduced 
acquisition workforce and the need to maintain an overall acquisition system that is 
fair, efficient, and transparent.  We cannot afford to revert back to the paperwork and 
labor-intensive system of the past.  Nor can we pursue operational efficiencies at the 
expense of reducing small business opportunities (OFPP, 2002, October 29, p. 4).  
The overall challenge facing the anti-bundling initiative is “to find an appropriate 
balance between operational efficiency, opportunity, and fairness (OFPP, 2002, 
October 29, p. 4). 
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In the Contract Bundling Report, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
outlined an action plan to deal with contract bundling in the Executive Branch.  This 
plan included  
accountability of senior agency management for improving contracting 
opportunities for small businesses” through periodic reports on bundling to, 
the Office of Management and Budget, and the Small Business 
Administration; reporting of contract bundling information through the 
President’s Management Council, composed of deputy heads of 26 major 
federal executive agencies; regulatory proposals to require contract bundling 
reviews for task and delivery orders under multiple-award contract vehicles; 
regulatory changes, in consultation with the SBA and the agency OSDBUs, to 
provide for review of acquisitions between $2 and $7 million for contract 
bundling; and additional regulatory changes to identify “alternative acquisition 
strategies for the proposed bundling of contracts above specified thresholds 
and written justification when alternatives involving less bundling are not 
used. (OFPP, 2002, October 29, p. 10)   
The Report also called for greater efforts to mitigate the effects of contract 
bundling, such as increased compliance with subcontracting plans by making 
compliance a factor in future awards; facilitation of small business teams and joint 
ventures, (e.g., by extending the time necessary to organize teams for particular 
procurements; identification of best practices for maximizing small business 
Opportunities; and dedication of the agency OSDBUs to the President’s Small 
Business Agenda) (OFPP, 2002, October 29, p. 4).   
Congress took further action to reduce contracts unsuitable for small firms by 
enacting special restrictions on contract consolidation by the Department of Defense 
in Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 
adopted in 2003 as Public Law 108-136, and codified at Title 10, Section 2382 of the 
United States Code.50  This statute generally prohibits consolidation of two or more 
contract requirements totaling over $5 million unless appropriate market research 
was conducted, alternatives to consolidation were identified, and senior-level 
                                            
50 See P.L. 108-136. 
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determination was made that consolidation was necessary and justified.  CICA and 
other contract bundling or contract consolidation statutes are implemented in the 
SBA Government Contracting Programs regulations, the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS).51  In October 2007, the Department of Defense published a Benefit 
Analysis Guidebook: A Reference to Assist the Department of Defense Acquisition 
Strategy Teams in Performing a Benefit Analysis Before Consolidating or Bundling 
Contract Requirements (DoD Office, 2007, October).  The Senate Committee on 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship sought to extend these restrictions to civilian 
agencies during the 108th Congress (US Congress, 2003, Section 401), and again 
during the 111th Congress (US Congress, 2010, Section 102).  The United States, 
however, never adopted a uniform policy against contract bundling or consolidation 
in state and local procurements. 
Anti-bundling efforts in the United States appear to have stalled at take-off.  
While most regulatory changes called for by the Contract Bundling Report have 
been implemented, the Government Accountability Office issued a report declaring 
the impact of the Initiative uncertain because of poor accountability measures (GAO, 
2004, May 27).  Indeed, top-level accountability on reduction in contract bundling 
and consolidation has been continuously lacking.  For instance, on August 3, 2006, 
then-Deputy Director for Management of the White House Office of Management 
and Budget Clay Johnson III wrote a letter to then-Senate Committee on Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship Chair Olympia J. Snowe with promises to develop a 
scorecard to monitor small business goal achievements as well as reductions in 
contract bundling (Johnson, 2006, August 3).   Unfortunately, the Small Business 
Procurement Scorecards subsequently released by the SBA and the White House 
under President George W. Bush and President Barack H. Obama contained no 
                                            
51 See, e.g. (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 125.2; GSA et al., 2010, Sections 6.101, 7.103, 10.001, and 19.202-1; 
OSD, 2010, Sections 207.170, 219.201). 
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measurements related to contract bundling (Preston & Denett, 2006, November 14; 
Ott, 2007, January 10).  However, the Obama Administration issued a memorandum 
directing Federal agencies to solicit industry input on “requirements were grouped 
inconsistent with the way services are commonly performed or provided by industry, 
or otherwise bundled to make it difficult for small businesses to compete” (Field, 
2009, October 27).  Finally, Section 820 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010 requires contracting officers to publish justifications of contract 
bundling and explanations of any benefits derived on any bundled contracts which 
use Department of Defense appropriations.52     
B. The European Approach: Addressing Contract Suitability   
In Europe, one of the driving principles behind the procurement system of the 
EU and its Member states is “equal treatment.”  With regard to the suitability of 
SMEs, some European commentators have argued that this principle means equal 
treatment to companies regardless of not only their geographic origin, but also 
economic power or size.53  This interpretation has been explicitly recognized in a 
recent policy study performed by EIM Business and Policy Research Company with 
commission by the Enterprise Directorate-General of the European Commission.54  
The study cited the Sixth Report (2000) of the European Observatory for SMEs, 
                                            
52 Public Law 111-84 (Oct. 28, 2009). 
53 See, e.g. Martin Burgi, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and Procurement Law – European Legal 
Framework and German Experiences, 4 PUB. PROC. L.REV. 284 (2007) This would be the case for example, if 
SME tenders, in contrast to tenders of major companies, were verified as most economically advantageous 
tenders only because of a financial or other economic preference for SMEs. This procedure would infringe the 
provisions of the Public Sector Directive and the Utilities Directive, since the contract award criteria for the 
most advantageous economic tender must refer only to the subject-matter of the public contract in question. 
Generally admissible criteria such as service and on-call maintenance can have an SME-friendly effect, 
however. Because of the danger of indirect discrimination, award criteria may only be justified by arguments 
that are linked to the subject of the public contract in question and not by the argument of SME friendliness or 
local settlement. The contrary position is argued by Ciara Kennedy-Loest, Spreading Contract Work to Ensure 
Security of Supply and Maintain Competition: The Issues Under the EC Directives, 2 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 116 
(2007) (arguing that procurement measures favoring SMEs at contract size, teaming, qualification, award, and 
performance stages could be justified on a case-by-case basis because they would carry out the objective of 
“opening up of public procurement to competition” as stated in the Public Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC ); 
54  See generally, EIM Final Report (EC, 2004, March). 
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which identified “the larger size of the contracts” as one of the key obstacles faced 
by small business in Europe, thus drawing the following conclusion: “It appears that 
the most important reason why SMEs do not try to participate in European tenders is 
that the projects are too large” (EC, 2004, March, p. 2).   
According to the EIM study of 2001 data, a typical SME contract award 
equals €249,000, while a typical large enterprise award equals about twice that—
€453,000.  The median size of contracts advertised on Europe’s TED database is 
somewhere between the two—€345,000.  According to the same database, the 
buyers with the most SME-friendly median are the armed forces (at €281,000), while 
local authorities tend to have somewhat higher medians (€306,000).  Because 60% 
of TED-advertised contract awards were made by local authorities, these authorities 
have the most ability to improve contract opportunities for small business by 
reducing contract size (EC, 2004, March, p. 15).      
Historically, Europe has not had a unified policy on contract size reduction.  
The EIM study found that while about 85% of public authorities surveyed try to 
provide size reduction assistance, the extent of these efforts varies widely among 
different Member States.  While over 90% of French and German authorities 
consider size reductions, only 30% of Dutch authorities consider such reductions.  
According to the EIM study, “[t]hroughout Europe, hardly any calls for tender are 
divided into smaller lots . . .. In twelve of the Member States [including U.K., 
Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, France, Finland, Denmark, 
Belgium, and Austria], this is done casually (whereby France is characterized by an 
increasing tendency towards the division of public procurement contracts into lots), 
in two of them (Luxembourg and Greece) none of the tenders are divided.  Only in 
Germany, division of tenders into lots is done often, resulting in a comparatively 
small average contract size” (EC, 2004, March, p. 79).  Coupled with the fact that 
Ireland was reported as having the highest median contract award (EC, 2004, 
March, p. 216), this data suggests that larger European nations tend to be much 
better at breakouts than smaller nations.   
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Recently, however, both the EU and national authorities began a concerted 
effort to pursue break-ups of consolidated contracts (also known as contract 
splitting) as a major tool of procurement assistance for SMEs.  “To a varying extent, 
contracting authorities have increasingly started to bundle their demands [...]. [T]he 
contracting entities can easily, without legislative change, create an SME-friendly 
environment by abandoning or dismantling such [bundled] structures. [...] If the 
responsible contracting officer does decide to purchase this demand by a central 
purchasing body or by advertising an extensive framework agreement, the SME-
endangering effect could be neutralized by a division of the resulting contracts into 
trade-specific or partial lots” (Burgi, 2007, p. 290).  For instance, as stated above, 
Article 11 of the European Defense Agency’s 2006 Code of Best Practice in the 
Supply Chain calls for participation of SMEs and other qualified suppliers in 
procurements “where competition is efficient, practical, and economically or 
technologically appropriate on a level-playing field basis.”  Further, the Small 
Business Act for Europe stated that “Member States are invited to [...] encourage 
their contacting authorities to subdivide contracts into lots where it is appropriate and 
to make sub-contracting opportunities more visible, [as well as to] remind their 
contracting authorities of their obligation to avoid disproportionate qualification and 
financial requirements” (EC, 2008, June 25, pp. 10-11).  Based on express but 
general authorizations in the Public Procurement Directives, the European Code of 
Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts 
advocates three strategies to overcome SMEs’ difficulties related to the size of large 
government contracts: (1) sub-dividing of contracts into lots and authorizing 
contractors to compete for unlimited number of lots; (2) grouping or teaming of small 
contractors;55 and (3) conclusion of framework agreements, known in the United 
States as multiple-award contracts, with SMEs in addition to agreements with large 
                                            
55 “From an SME point of view, this instrument is very interesting as a tool for their promotion, especially if it is 
ensured normatively or by means of the contracting authority's behaviour that groups of economic operators are 
as equally treated as single bidders. The Procurement Directives expressly legitimise the formation of groups of 
economic operators” (Burgi, 2007,  p. 290). Burgi is citing Article 4(2) of the Public Procurement Directive. 
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businesses.  According to the Code, the first strategy was supported by laws or best 
practices from countries including Austria, France, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, 
and Ireland.56  Likewise, the Code provided that the second strategy was supported 
by the EU business partnering initiative called the Enterprise Europe Network.57  The 
third strategy, per the Code, was supported by laws or best practices from the UK, 
                                            
56 Specifically, the 2008 EC Code of Best Practices provides on pages 6-7: 
National law.  According to Austrian law, contracting authorities have the freedom to decide whether 
to award a global contract or to sub-divide it into separate lots. When taking such a decision, they have 
to take into account economic or technical aspects.  In France, in order to attract the widest possible 
competition, the general rule is to award contracts in the form of separate lots. However, contracting 
authorities have the freedom to award global contracts if they consider that the sub-division into lots 
would, in the given case, restrict competition, or risk to render the execution of the contract technically 
difficult or expensive, or if the contracting authority would not be in a position to ensure the co-
ordination of the performance of the contract.  The promotion of the sub-division of contracts into lots 
is accompanied in some Member States (Hungary, Romania) by provisions of national law which 
specify that the selection criteria must be related and proportionate to the individual lots and not to the 
aggregate value of all lots. 
Practices.  In Ireland, as in other Member States, it is the practice of many contracting authorities when 
advertising large construction contracts to advertise and award contracts for some of the specialist 
aspects (electrical services, mechanical services, specialist fitting contracts, etc.) separately to 
economic operators who are required to work together with the economic operator which has been 
awarded the contract for the co-ordination of the whole project. This practice facilitates participation 
by SMEs, while the contracting authority does not have to deal with the challenges that arise from co-
ordinating the execution of the different lots.  In Lithuania, the public procurement office carries out an 
ex-ante analysis of contract notices before they are sent for publication in the TED-database and, as 
part of this analysis, it recommends to the contracting authority to consider sub-dividing the contract 
into lots. 
Indeed, German law appears to require not only the splitting of prime contracts into partial and trade lots in 
order protect SME interests, but also requires contracting officers to obligate prime contractors to conduct 
competitive subcontracting of the prime contractors do not subdivide their contracts into such lots (Burgi, 2007,  
p. 290).  Burgi is citing Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungenthe [German Act Against Restraints on 
Competition], 26 August 1998, BGBl. I at 2546, § 97(3) (F.R.G.)).  In France, “Article 10 of the Public 
Procurement Contracts Code establishes the following principle: ‘in the interests of the broadest possible 
competition, and unless the object of the contract does not lend itself to the identification of distinct lots, the 
contracting authority may award the contract in separate lots.’  The main aim of this article is to make public 
procurement more accessible to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) not necessarily equipped to 
perform the full extent of a public contract” (French Ministry, 2007, July). 
57  Specifically, the 2008 EC Code of Best Practices provides on page 8: 
Practices.  SMEs may benefit from the advice and support of the easily accessible members of the 
Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) located in Member States. Launched in 2008, the EEN offers 
support and advice to businesses across Europe and helps them make the most of the opportunities in 
the European Union. Its services are specifically designed for SMEs but are also available to all 
businesses, research centres and universities across Europe. It provides information on EU legislation, 
helps find business partners, offers possibilities to participate in innovation networks and provides 
information on funding opportunities (see: http://www.enterprise-europe-
network.ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm). 
 
=
=
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 60 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
Germany, and Romania.58  The Code also advocates greater visibility of 
subcontracting opportunities and greater equity in subcontracting.  This strategy was 
supported by best practices from Romania, the UK, and Germany.59  Similar pro-
SME contract splitting and multiple-award framework agreements are recommended 
by the UK Office of Government Commerce as measures to overcome over-
dependency on traditional, large suppliers (UK Office, 2004, July; Kennedy-Loest, 
2007).   
C. Comparison 
It appears that the historic European approach to ensuring the suitability of 
contracts for small businesses by means of voluntary compliance with system-wide 
                                            
58 The 2008 EC Code of Best Practices states at page 9:  
Practices.  In Romania, the issue of how to ensure that the process of being included into a framework 
agreement with several economic operators is proportionate has been addressed by way of a guidance 
document, which points out that the minimum levels of ability required when awarding a framework 
agreement must be related and proportionate to the largest contract due to be concluded, and not to the 
total amount of contracts planned for the entire duration of the framework agreement.  The U.K. has 
produced guidance which advises contracting authorities, even if they have a framework agreement in 
place, to consider how best value for money can be obtained, including the possibility to buy outside 
the framework agreement if: - short-term market conditions (e.g. an unexpected decrease of the price 
of a certain product) mean contracting authorities could get better value; - innovative goods or 
solutions are not represented in the existing framework agreements.  In Germany, experience shows 
that SMEs are well represented in framework agreements that are used to cover recurring needs of 
contracting authorities for small-scale services or supplies (e.g. printing services).  A case study from 
the U.K. illustrates how a framework arrangement for suppliers of office furniture was set up that 
included large and small enterprises. Large furniture suppliers were able to achieve economies of scale 
for standard office furniture, and SMEs were able to provide flexibility in meeting requirements for 
special items, such as reception and conference room furniture and specialist seating. The latter items 
are typically specified to a higher standard and will vary from order to order. In this way the 
contracting authority achieved value for money in both standard and specialist items of furniture. 
59 The 2008 EC Code of Best Practices states at page 10: 
Practices.  The U.K. advises contracting authorities to make subcontracting opportunities more visible 
to SMEs. Contracting authorities are encouraged to ensure there is visibility of the supply chain by 
taking a number of measures, such as: - Publishing, on the contracting authority's website, the names 
of companies acting as prime contractors in a procurement and details of awarded and upcoming 
contracts; - Where appropriate, contracting authorities are encouraged to ask their main suppliers to 
demonstrate their track record in achieving value for money through the effective use of their supply 
chain, including how SMEs can gain access to their subcontracting opportunities.  
National law. According to German law, the contracting authority has to stipulate in the documentation 
that the successful tenderer may not impose less favourable conditions on its subcontractors than the 
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recommendations closely resembled the approach pursued by the United States 
during the 1940s and the 1950s.  Presently, Europeans are transitioning towards 
hybrid measures which resemble the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) and the 
Section 801 defense contract consolidation statute in terms of competition standards 
and break-up remedies, but also resembling the Small Business Act in that these 
measures are invoked specifically (if not exclusively) for the benefit of SMEs.  While 
the two Transatlantic systems share the goal of promoting fairness in public 
procurement, the United States’ anti-bundling efforts are driven by additional 
considerations of promoting business ownership, ensuring a robust supplier base, 
and making the economic strengths of small enterprises available to the public 
sector.  It appears that the current US approach on legislative and regulatory 
standards requiring contracting officers to measure benefits and costs of bundling 
pursuant to the Small Business Act has more “teeth” than the European approach.  
However, this appearance may be deceptive, as no comprehensive bundling 
enforcement data was available at the time of this writing.  Nonetheless, further 
strengthening contract suitability policies by legislation appears to be the next 
natural step for the authorities of united Europe and its Member States as well as for 
the United States.  
                                                                                                                                       
conditions agreed on between him and the contracting authority, especially as far as payment 
arrangements are concerned. 
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VI. Small Business Prime Contracting Goals, 
Set-Asides, and Reservations 
In light of the European Commission’s trade rhetoric against SME set-asides 
and goals, one might expect that SME set-asides do not exist in Europe.  Such 
expectation would be incorrect, as both the United States and Europe have long had 
small business set-asides, goals, targets, or reservations in various forms. 
A. The US Approach: A Tradition of Goals and Set-Asides; 
Size or Status as Eligibility or Responsibility Criteria 
Since the late 1940s, Congress directed agencies to award a “fair share” or 
“fair proportion” of Government contracts or orders and to provide for “equitable” or 
“greatest possible” small business participation in a string of procurement statutes, 
including Section 2(b) of the Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA) of 1947,60 
Section 18 of the Selective Service Act (SSA) of 1948,61 Section 302(b) of the 
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) of 1949,62 Section 701(b) 
of the Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 (Saltonstall, 1957, January 25),63 and 
Section 202 of the Small Business Act of 1953.64  It appears that the “fair share” 
small business procurement policies were meant to remedy the damage done to the 
small business sector during the military conflicts of the first half of the Twentieth 
Century when small businesses were effectively denied the resources and the sales 
opportunities in defense procurement, and to prevent similar damage in the future 
                                            
60 Public Law 80-413 (Feb. 19, 1948) codified prior to repeal at USC Title 41 §151 (1948).  Most military-
specific small business procurement policies are currently codified at USC Title 10 §2301) et seq. 
61 Public Law 80-759 (June 24, 1948). 
62Public Law 81-152 (June 30, 1949). 
63 Saltonstall (1957) refers to Pub. Law No. 81-774 (Sept. 8, 1950). 
64Originally enacted as Public Law No. 83-163 (July 30, 1953).  
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Shestack & Long, 1950-1951).65  As noted by Senator Leverett Saltonstall in his 
lecture at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, “[i]n both World War II and the 
Korean conflict, consideration for the particular needs of small business came too 
late to prevent damage to their competitive position in the economy” (Saltonstall, 
1957, January 25).66  Congressional efforts to direct the fair share of government 
contracts originally did not include a participation goal stated in terms of a defined 
percentage of total contracts.  However, in the absence of a statutory numerical 
target, the annual portion of small business prime contracts fluctuated widely.  In the 
defense procurement, for instance, these awards ranged from 16% to 32% every 
year for over 10 years following the end of World War II (US Congress, 1951, p. 11).  
By comparison, the small business share in defense contracts is currently in the low 
twentieth percentile (DoD Office).67  In 1978, the Small Business Act amendments 
directed the establishment of annual small business procurement goals for federal 
agencies (Army, 2008, March).  The Business Opportunity Development Reform Act 
of 198868 established a government-wide small business prime contracting goal of no 
less than 20%.  The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 199769 increased the 
                                            
65 Note, Utilization of Industry Section of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 24 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. 216 (1949). 
66 One Congressional report described this problem as follows;  
Small business has been unable to obtain a fair share of defense contracts. This is a problem of 
business life or death to thousands of small manufacturing concerns which have been unable to obtain 
materials to continue in civilian production. Of course, the path of least resistance is that of loading 
defense contracts on to large corporations and allowing small business to fall by the wayside. This is 
the path which was followed in the early years of World War II, when 100 large corporations received 
67 percent of prime contracts. During this same period, one-sixth of the small businesses in the Nation 
closed their doors. This mistake must not be repeated.   
Siller Bros., Inc. v. United States, 655 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 456 US 925 
(1982) (citing Report On Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951 (US Congress, 1951),  which 
was reprinted in 1951 US Code Cong. & Ad. News 1626, 1645-46). 
 
67 The DoD shows that small firms received 22.375% in Fiscal Year 2009. 
68 Pub. L. No. 100-656 (1988). 
69 Pub. L. No. 105-135 (1997), amendment codified at USC Title 15 § 644(j) (2010). 
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government-wide statutory small business goal to no less than 23% of all prime 
contracts.  Congress also established goals for specific small business categories, 
as discussed below.  These goals are codified in the Small Business Act at Title 15, 
Section 644(g) of the United States Code.   
Congress and the Executive Branch have authorized or required small 
business set-asides as means to obtain fair share objectives and defense or civilian 
industrial base objectives.  The Small Business Act broadly provides in Title 15, 
Section 644(a) of the United States Code that: 
to effectuate the purposes [of the Act,] [...] small-business concerns  [...] shall 
receive any award or contract or any part thereof, and be awarded any 
contract for the sale of Government property, as to which it is determined by 
the [Small Business] Administration and the contracting  [...] agency (1) to be 
in the interest of maintaining or mobilizing the Nation’s full productive 
capacity, (2) to be in the interest of war or national defense programs, [or] (3) 
to be in the interest of assuring that a fair proportion of the total purchases 
and contracts for property and services for the Government in each industry 
category are placed with small-business concerns. [...] These determinations 
may be made for individual awards or contracts or for classes of awards or 
contracts. (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 644(a))   
In 1984, the White House Office of Federal Procurement Policy amended the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation to implement this legislation on a class basis by 
creating the so-called Rule of Two.  The Rule of Two requires the set-aside of any 
acquisition over $100,000 “when there is a reasonable expectation that (1) offers will 
be obtained from at least two responsible small business concerns offering the 
products of different small business concerns . . . and (2) award will be made at fair 
market prices” (GSA et al., 2010, Section 19.502-2(b)).  For set-asides in the R&D 
sector, “there must also be a reasonable expectation of obtaining from small 
businesses the best scientific and technological sources consistent with the 
demands of the proposed acquisition for the best mix of cost, performance, and 
schedule” (GSA et al., 2010, Section 19.502-2(b)).  The Rule of Two applies to task 
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order competition in multiple-award contracts (Delex Systems, 2008).70  Partial set-
asides are also required where a total set-aside is not appropriate, but contracts can 
be broken up into lots that are appropriate for set-asides (GSA et al., 2010, Section 
19.502-3).  Further, the FAR requires set-asides based on fair proportion, national 
defense, or national capacity grounds (GSA et al., 2010, Section 19.502-1(a)(1)).  
The SBA regulations also encourage Federal agencies to consider a small business 
reservation on multiple-award contracts by “reserving one of more awards for small 
companies when issuing multiple awards under task order contracts” (CFR, 2010, 
Title 13, Section 125.2(b)(6)(i)(C)).   
Over time, Congress began to establish another so-called small business 
reservation by requiring that small contracts below a certain dollar amount be 
exclusively set aside for small businesses.  The set-aside amount was originally set 
at $25,000.  In the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Congress 
amended the Small Business Act to reserve, or set aside, all contracts between 
$2,500 (sometimes known as the Micro-Purchase Threshold) and $100,000 (also 
known as the Simplified Acquisition Threshold) for awards to small firms in which 
two or more responsible small firms are available (1994).71  The $2,500 MPT has 
since been adjusted for inflation to $3,000, and the reservation range was adjusted 
to between $15,000 and $250,000 for contracts related to contingency operations or 
support of defense or recovery from nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological 
attacks (GSA et al., 2010, Section 19.502-2(a)).  
Socio-economic goals and set-aside procedures in the Small Business Act 
have been reinforced by special legislation for the Department of Defense, the Coast 
                                            
70 Accord, President William J. Clinton’s (1994, October 13) memorandum Continued Commitment to Small, 
Small Disadvantaged, and Small Women-Owned Businesses in Federal Procurement (announcing continued 
commitment to small business set-asides upon signing of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-355). 
71 Pub. L. No. 103-355 (Oct. 14, 1994), implemented in FAR 19.502-2(a) (GSA, et al., 2010). 
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Guard, and the National Aeronautic and Space Administration in Title 10, Section 
2323 of the United States Code.  Among other things, Section 2323 requires these 
agencies to ensure that contract dollars and numbers of awards awarded under the 
small business set-aside program are maintained.72 
B. The European Approach: Warming Up to Goals and Set-
Asides; Effective Set-Asides; Size or Status of Team 
Members as Award Criteria 
Historically, Europeans shied from adopting general small business goals or 
set-asides at the prime contracting level.  Objections in European literature on this 
subject primarily reflect academic policy arguments such as potential economies of 
scale, the need to ensure that large businesses are treated no less equally than 
SMEs, and administrative efficiency, but there is also European literature with 
contrary policy arguments, such as security of supply, competitive industrial base, 
and economic development.73  Further, over the last two decades, the European 
Court of Justice clarified that it is willing to allow set-asides, preferences, or goals 
based on collateral policies if these policies are endorsed by the European 
Commission.74  This position apparently remains prevalent at this time, and the 42% 
                                            
72 See also DFARS Part 219 (OSD, 2010); Navy-Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS) 
Part 5219 (2010); NASA FAR Supplement Part 1819 (2010); and Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation 
(HSAR) Part 3019 (2010).  The exception to the normally pro-set-aside procurement regulations is the so-called 
Small Business Competitiveness Demonstration Program, which forces small firms to compete with large 
businesses in certain sectors.  See FAR (GSA et al., 2010) Subpart 19.10.  
73 Compare Ncholas Hatzis (2009, pp. 345, 347, n. 10), who cites the European Commission’s Communication 
to the Council: Promoting SME Participation in Public Procurement in the Community (EC, 1990, May 7). In 
that Communication, the Commission rejected SME-favoring measures at the prime contracting level such as 
reservations, set-asides, price evaluation preferences, and “indirect discrimination [which] could arise where 
SMEs predominate among the enterprises of a region or locality that is itself the subject of preference.”  The 
main argument was a criticism of US-style small business preferences on policy grounds such as administrative 
costs, economies of scale and other competitive benefits of large businesses, and alleged disincentives for 
modernization and productivity improvements.  However, the Communication rejected these same arguments in 
favor of mandatory subcontracting with SMEs.   
74 In Communication to the Council: Promoting SME Participation in Public Procurement in the Community 
(EC, 1990, May 7), the European Commission has argued that unspecified “certain preference regimes” were 
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level of SME participation in European public procurement prime contracts as of 
Fiscal Year 2005 (EC, 2008b, June 25) does not present a compelling case for 
across-the-board goals or set-asides.  However, when it comes to critically important 
markets such as R&D or the space industry, the Europeans are firmly committed to 
SME-targeted measures including set-asides and goals.  Europeans have, however, 
provided state aid targeted at SMEs, including SMEs that act as public procurement 
suppliers.  Further, as discussed in other chapters, Europeans prefer to utilize SME 
participation as one of contract-by-contract socioeconomic criteria included in the 
value for money award analysis.  As further addressed in other chapters, the 
Europeans prefer to use binding SME subcontracting targets which resemble both 
goals and set-asides, to be imposed on contract-by-contract basis.    
 As observed just six years ago, “[s]ince the Competition Law does not allow 
direct support of access of SMEs to public contracts, policy instruments have to be 
                                                                                                                                       
contrary to “Community law” and the Treaty based on the European Court of Justice decision in DuPont de 
Nemours Italiana Spa v. Unita Sanitaria Locale No. 2 Di Carrara, Case C-21/88, 1990 ECR I-889.  Again, that 
decision concerned a domestic preference.  Further, in PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, Case C-379/98, 
2001 2 C.M.L.R. 36, the European Court of Justice distinguished between the invalid requirement that 
percentage of a product be obtained from a domestic supplier at issue in DuPont de Nemours Italiana Spa case 
from the valid requirements to purchase from renewable energy sources within the supply area of public and 
private electricity suppliers.  The renewable energy requirements were validated thanks, in part, to the policy 
statements from the European Commission encouraging renewable energy.   However, the Communication 
noted on page 6 that “SMEs increasingly gain access to larger public contracts through sub-contracting [...] [and 
t]he public procurement directives leave Member States a wide freedom to pursue an active policy of 
encouraging local sub-contracting.”  The Commission found support for SME subcontracting preferences in a 
European Court of Justice decision which approved the use mandatory contract conditions and award criteria 
requiring the use of long-term unemployed, provided these conditions/criteria were fully disclosed in advance in 
the solicitation and were not discriminatory on the basis of nationality.  See Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. 
Netherlands, Case No. 31/87, 1988 ECR 4635.  Thus, the Beentjes case and its interpretation by the 
Commission appear to be inconsistent with the view that EU-wide SME preferences are contrary to the Treaty.   
Like Hatzis in the preceding footnote, Martin Burgi (2007) argued that “[b]ecause of the danger of 
indirect discrimination, award criteria may only be justified by arguments that are linked to the subject of the 
public contract in question and not by the argument of SME friendliness or local settlement” (p. 288).  Burgi 
(2007) cites Contse SA, Vivisol Srl, Oxigen Salud SA v Instituto Nacional de Gestión Sanitaria (Ingesa), former 
Instituto Nacional de la Salud (Insalud) Case C-234/03, 2005 ECR I-09315)).  However, the case on which 
Burgi relied again concerns purely the requirements governing the bidders’ location within a local province, and 
makes no references whatsoever to SMEs.  Thus, to date, there appears to be no European Court of Justice 
precedent precluding SME set-asides or goals in civilian or dual-use procurements as a matter of the EC Treaty. 
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concentrated on lowering the obstacles for SMEs on the public procurement market” 
(EC, 2004, March).   The European Commission’s procurement directives which 
regulate acquisitions of various types of products or services in Member States 
“have been interpreted as allowing for little if any role for policies intended to assist 
SMEs in the European Community” (International, 2002).  This stance is primarily 
attributable to the Commission’s intent to use the directives in order to secure the 
benefits of liberalizing national procurement markets.  Under this system, SME 
preferences by national procurement authorities have been disfavored as contrary to 
the principle of equal treatment of firms from each Member State.  Indeed, 
“[m]ember state programmes designed to provide preferences for domestic firms or 
restrictions on entry of the firms of other member states in procurement may be 
subject to challenge by the EC Commission as an infringement of the directives” 
(International, 2002).  The European Commission formerly deemed national-firm 
preferences on contracts above the European-wide thresholds to be contrary to the 
requirements of the Procurement Directives then in force (International, 2002).     
However, as noted by the International Trade Center of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization, the 
Europeans have never been against SME set-asides in principle:   
[The European Commission] does not appear to rule out the possibility of 
preferential measures for SMEs for procurements below the threshold of 
application as set forth in the directives.  For acceptance by the EC 
Commission, such programmes would likely require clear definitions of 
qualifying SMEs, compatibility among national regimes, and strict conformity 
with EC treaty requirements on transparency, equality of treatment, and non-
discrimination. (International, 2002)75 
                                            
75 Accord, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, French Minister of State for European Affairs, Interview with La 
Tribune, (July 5, 2007) http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Jean-Pierre-Jouyet-talks-to-La.html (“Q. – 
What stage have we got to regarding the possibility of giving SMEs greater access to public 
procurement?  The Minister – We have to find an appropriate legal mechanism allowing us to raise 
at the WTO the issue of having a European small business act as the Americans did when they 
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Within the space industry, SME set-asides have a long history at the 
European Space Agency.  ESA has awarded at least two types of SME prime 
contracting set-asides.  The first type of set-asides is the EC-supported “exploratory 
awards” under €30,000 reserved solely to “non-primes (including SMEs) (Petrou, 
2008, pp. 149-150, notes 46-51).  The second type of set-asides is the Leading-
Edge Technologies from Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (LET-SME) 
Announcements of Opportunity up to €200,000 for a period of 6 to 18 months for 
technical adaptation, testing, or customization of technologies (ESA).  The LET-SME 
set-asides have been in existence since 1998.  Politically, ESA set-asides are also 
related to the principle of juste retour, or fair return on investment made by countries 
towards the ESA budget: “smaller countries tend to receive their fair return through 
contracts awarded to smaller companies” (Petrou, 2008, pp. 169).76 
Despite its professed antagonism to US small business set-asides, the EC 
over time took several steps that make it easier to institute SME set-asides at the 
prime contracting level.  For instance, over the last several years, the EC has 
explicitly promoted several R&D SME set-aside programs under the framework of 
Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER) (Petrou, 2008, pp. 150, note 48).77  In 
2006, the EC’s EU Scientific and Technical Research Committee observed that EC 
rules also provide for SME preferences in the context of state aid, that EU 
procurement rules are unclear on set-asides, and that “[t]he argument for 
preferential treatment of SMEs under the Community Framework for state aid for 
research and development can be similarly applied to public procurement” (EC, 
CREST, 2006).  Also, the EU legal framework apparently authorizes the equivalent 
                                                                                                                                       
managed to get their own small business act accepted in the WTO negotiations. With Brussels, it’s 
more a matter of legal adjustment than one of principle.”). 
76 Accord, U.K. Space Industry (UK House, 2000, July 4) “ESA largely (and historically) operates on the 
principle of ‘juste retour’: the principles that the proportion of contracts under a particular program awarded to 
firms from a given country is in proportion to the funding that country has contributed to the program.” 
77 Petrou (2008) cites SME set-asides under the EC’s Fourth and Fifth R&D Framework Programs. 
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of the low-value small business reservation authority (GSA et al., 2010, Section 
19.502-2(a)) in the United States: “Set-asides are legal under European 
procurement legislation for contracts below European thresholds.  However, this use 
must not discriminate against SMEs from other Member States” (Erridge, 1998, p. 
41).   
Indeed, although the Public Procurement Directive, the Defense Procurement 
Directive, and the EC Code of Best Practices do not expressly authorize SME set-
asides or goals, the directives and the Code combined with certain national 
procurement authorities can have the effect of set-asides for SMEs or teams 
involving SMEs.  The effective SME team set-asides are created by operation of four 
types of provisions: provisions favoring consideration of social factors in 
procurement, requirements for mandatory subcontracting with SMEs, provisions 
encouraging splitting contracts into lots, limitations on lots, and provisions 
encouraging SME participation groupings of bidders.  First, an effective preference 
or set-aside can be created for SMEs when contracts are split into lots “quantitatively 
(the size of the lots may better correspond to the productive capacity of the SME) 
and qualitatively (the content of the lots may correspond more closely to the 
specialized sector of the SME),” there is a legal limitation on the number of lots any 
bidder may receive, and government contracting authorities are required to provide 
extensive documentary justification that at least some SMEs are able to bid for the 
lots.  This appears to be the situation in, for example, Germany under the Public 
Procurement Directive and German law (EC, 2008b, June 25).78   Under the United 
Kingdom guidance against over-dependency on large suppliers, similar set-asides 
                                            
78 The EC Code of Best Practices cites Article 9(5) of 2004/18/EC Public Procurement Directive as authority 
for splitting contracts.  Accord Martin Burgi (2007), who argues that Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungenthe [German Act Against Restraints on Competition], 26 August 1998, BGBl. I at 
2546, § 97(3) (F.R.G.) creates a preference for SMEs through (1) a legally enforceable obligation to split 
contracts to fit capabilities and industry specialties of SMEs, (2) requirements for government officials to justify 
when they do not split contracts or fail to issue small orders under framework agreements; and (3) limits on the 
number of lots a firm can receive.  
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could effectively take place.79  Further, the EC Code of Best Practices promotes as a 
best practice a UK framework agreement which included awards for SMEs as a way 
to achieve value for money (EC, 2008b, June 25).  Second, an effective set-aside or 
preference can be created for bidders’ groupings that involve SMEs when 
contracting authorities require that a large contractor subcontracts certain portion of 
the work to SMEs while modifying Requests for Tender (RFT) to encourage 
groupings that involve SMEs.80      
EU Member States appear open to the possibility of instituting SME 
procurement goals within their nations as well as across Europe.  The leading 
advocate for this sentiment is French President Nicholas Sarkozy, who has taken 
the position that SME set-asides, goals, and preferences in public procurement are 
consistent with free trade and competition principles:  
Now there are things the Americans do which I’ve never understood us not 
doing in Europe. Let me take the Small Business Act: the Americans 
advocate freedom, but that doesn’t prevent them – and I think they’re right – 
from defending small and medium-size companies and reserving a proportion 
of public procurement for them. I’m not telling you that you are wrong; I’m 
saying you’re right. What do I want for Europe? For us to do the same thing!  
Because a country needs large groups, but also a fabric of SMEs. You are a 
great free-trade country, but, in fact, you have adopted different fiscal 
legislation for products manufactured in your country from those which aren’t! 
I think you’re right! Because, after all, it’s the State’s job to support its 
companies. (Sarkozy, 2007, November 6) 
According to a 2006 comparative procurement survey through the European 
Public Procurement Network, Austria,81 France,82 Greece,83 and Sweden84 have either 
                                            
79 It appears that the UK over-dependency policy guidance permits exclusion of large businesses as sources, 
which could effectively result in a small business set-aside (UK Office, 2004, July; Kennedy-Loest, 2007).   
80 Cf. (EC, 2008b, June 25). 
81 European Public Procurement Network’s 2006 Survey on National Public Procurement Regulations Favoring 
SMEs (Small or Medium Enterprises): “Question: Is there in your country a regulation that favours or benefits 
SME's (small or medium enterprises), for example by an obligation or otherwise (like contracts below certain 
thresholds are only for SME's or 25 % of all contracts by a contracting authority have to be awarded to SME's)?  
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already adopted, or have been considering adoption, of SME goals, reservations, 
preferences, or special considerations.  Further, in 2007, French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy and the French government formally proposed that the European 
Commission authorize reservations of a portion of EU contracts for SMEs.85  The 
French government has also been seeking to negotiate an exemption from the 
World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement for contracts set 
aside for European SMEs (French Ministry, 2009).    The set-aside proposal was not 
made part of the Small Business Act for Europe, but the concept of goals remained 
popular.86  For instance, the UK’s Labor Government has recently considered 
imposing an across the board 30% prime contracting goal for SMEs.  In March 2008, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer created the so-called “Glover Committee” to 
                                                                                                                                       
Austria: No legal obligation to favor SME's exists. Although in some cases SME's are to be taken in due 
consideration.” 
82 Id. (“France: No: currently not (considering changes) but there are several general provisions that apply to all 
economic operators but are particularly useful for SME's.”) 
83 Id. (“Greece: Yes, there is a regulation as regards works and research contracts that favors SME's through the 
obligatory registration of companies in classes depending on their size and the level of the budget of contracts 
sought. Thus, lower class registered companies can participate in competitions for contracts of lower budget 
where other, in higher-class registered companies may not.”) 
84 Id. (“Sweden: No such regulation, but Sweden has adopted a secondary legislation within the system of 
government procurement of framework agreements, in which one phrase says: ‘In that connection (framework 
agreements – editors’ comment) the possibility of small and medium size enterprises to participate in the 
procurements shall be considered.’”) 
85 See, e.g. France Softens Its Stance on EU Small Business Act, EurActiv.com (Jan. 28, 2008) 
http://www.euractiv.com/de/node/219270.  Notably, French President Nicholas Sarkozy campaigned on the 
promise to set aside US-style small business set-asides, reservations, and preferences in French procurement, 
and has spoken out in support of “positive discrimination” for SMEs which received 33 percent of French 
public procurement dollars as of 2007.  See SMEs: Sarkozy Wants Positive Discrimination and Alan Lambert 
Wants to Remove the Code (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.publictendering.com/en/pme-sarkozy-veut-une-
discrimination-positive-et-alain-lambert-veut-supprimer-le-code/; Lionel Stoleru: It is Urgent to SMEs with 
High Potential Into the Global Market (Jan. 7, 2008) http://www.publictendering.com/en/lionel-stoleru-il-est-
urgent-damener-les-pme-a-fort-potentiel-sur-le-marche-mondial/.  However, his set-aside plans were stymied 
by the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement and position of the French Council 
of State, and he had to settle for monitoring of agency SME contract award trends and more limited preferences 
at the present time.  Id. 
86 See, e.g. EurActiv.com, France Softens Its Stance on EU Small Business Act, (Jan. 28, 2008) 
http://www.euractiv.com/de/node/219270. 
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address this topic (Glover, 2008, p. 3).  Ultimately, the Glover Committee concluded 
in November 2008 that a goal “would not be effective in improving SME participation 
in public procurement” (Glover, 2008, p. 3).  However, that same month, the leader 
of the Conservative Party, David Cameron, proposed an “aspiration that 25% of 
Government contracts should be awarded to SMEs” similarly to the US 23% goal 
(Letsrecycle.com, 2008).  Further, in April 2009, the 400-member UK House of 
Commons All-Party Parliamentary Small Business Group expressly repudiated the 
Glover Committee’s conclusion concerning SME goals, and called on public 
authorities to set non-binding, ambitious targets for SME contract awards (UK House 
of Commons All-Party, 2009, April).87   
Another “set-aside light” measure gaining popularity in Europe is high-level 
monitoring of SME participation in public contracts without publicly available goals.  
Essentially, this is institutionalized oversight by national political leaders designed to 
pressure government agencies into more contracts for SMEs.  For example, since 
2006, the French government requires government agencies to measure and report 
contract awards to SMEs (Ide, 2008).88  Likewise, the 2007 Responsible Purchasing 
Strategy issued by the Scottish Parliament calls for regular measurement and 
reporting of SME contract awards, as well as evaluations of procurement officials on 
contracting with SMEs (Scottish Parliament, 2007, pp. 14-19).   Thus, it appears 
likely that SME goals and set-asides will be expanded across Europe from R&D and 
space contracting into other types of procurements.  
                                            
87  The UK House of Commons All-Party Parliamentary Small Business Group includes members in both the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords. 
88 “Decree No. 2006-975 of August 1, 2006 amended the French Public Procurement Code for a better access of 
SMEs to public procurement.  The main amendments concerned: a) the subdivision of contracts into lots, b) the 
creation of more flexible rules for economic operators to prove their technical abilities [...] [and] c) the 
obligation of purchasers to measure and report on contracts awarded to SMEs.”). 
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C. Comparison 
Without question, the United States has been the leader in applying 
procurement policy tools such as set-asides, reservations, and goals.  However, the 
Europeans also utilize targeted policies such as set-asides or reservations, although 
on a smaller scale and in specific industry sectors such as space.  Furthermore, the 
concept of prime contracting goals is currently supported by top leaders in several 
major European nations.  It is likely to see enactment in the near future.  Finally, 
both Europe and the United States have emphasized small business set-asides in 
space procurements.  
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VII. Contracting With Small Firms for 
Economic Sustainability and Remedial 
Purposes 
Another aspect of small business contracting policy present both in the United 
States and in Europe is contracting for remedial and sustainability purposes.  In this 
context, authorities in the United States typically direct contracts towards small 
businesses in certain categories closely related to remedial or sustainability 
objectives, while the European authorities appear to invoke remedial or sustainability 
objectives in order to contract with SMEs without further classifying SMEs into 
special categories. 
A. The US Approach: Small Business Socio-Economic 
Categories 
The procurement assistance provisions in the Small Business Act are not 
limited to helping small businesses in general; rather, they reach further to several 
specific subsets of the small business sector.  These subsets include small 
disadvantaged businesses (SDBs) (i.e., firms owned and controlled by socially or 
economically disadvantaged individuals or by Native American tribes, Alaska Native 
Corporations, or Native Hawaiian Organizations), SDBs admitted in the SBA’s 
Section 8(a) Business Development Program, small businesses located in 
Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones) and employing HUBZone 
residents (HUBZone small businesses), small businesses owned and controlled by 
service-disabled veterans (SDVOSBs), and small businesses owned and controlled 
by women (WOSBs) (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 644(g)).  These groups have 
been targeted by Congress with preferential measures for a variety of social or 
economic reasons.   
For instance, the HUBZone empowerment contracting program was 
established to bring market-based economic development to urban and rural 
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economically distressed areas (Army, 2008).  The WOSB small business 
procurement program was established to address discriminatory under-
representation of women in certain industries (Army, 2008).  The SDVOSB program 
was established to provide entrepreneurship opportunities for those who sacrificed 
their health in the service of the Nation (Army, 2008).  The SDB and the 8(a) SDB 
programs were established to provide contracting benefits in recognition of past 
racial injustices and other discrimination (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 644).  Each of 
these categories has its own set of prime contracting and subcontracting goals 
established by law or SBA policy (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 644(g)), which are 
included into the calculation of the overall small business procurement goals.    
In addition, Congress and the SBA granted all these categories separate set-
asides and other assistance tools (GSA et al., 2010, Part 19).  For example, the 
HUBZone, 8(a) SDBs, and SDVOSB firms may receive contracts on a sole source 
basis (GSA et al., 2010, Sections 19.801-1, 19.1306, 19.1406).  Further, the 
HUBZone and SDB firms may benefit from price evaluation adjustments in full and 
open competitions (GSA et al., 2010, Subpart 19.11; Section 19.1307).   
SBA regulations set forth legally binding criteria concerning set-asides for 
small business categories as well as status eligibility of potential contractors (GSA et 
al., 2010, Subpart 19.3).89  Under these regulations, potential contractors can 
generally protest set-aside decisions of contracting agencies and status or eligibility 
of their competitors.   These protests can be heard by the SBA, the Government 
Accountability Office, or the Court of Federal Claims depending on the issue.   
The Executive Branch implemented additional procurement assistance 
measures targeted at specific categories of small firms.  For instance, President 
Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12073, Federal Procurement In Labor Surplus 
                                            
89 FAR Subpart 19.3 (GSA et al., 2010) references SBA status protest regulations for each small business 
category. 
 
=
=
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 79 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
Areas, requiring set-asides for small business located in labor surplus areas (Carter, 
1978, August 16).  Likewise, FAR Subpart 26.2 currently authorizes set-asides for 
small businesses located in Federally-directed disaster areas.  In 1983, President 
Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12432, Minority Business Enterprise 
Development, directing all agencies with substantial procurement or grantmaking 
authority to promote procurement from minority business enterprises (MBEs) 
(Reagan, 1983, July 14).  Federal tribunals generally require that race-based 
preferences be narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest in remedying past 
discrimination by the procurement agency at issue, but permit wide discretion for 
preferences based on purely economic factors.90          
B. The European Approach: Sustainability and Non-
Discrimination as Elements of Best Value 
In Europe, economic sustainability and remedial considerations have been 
taken into account on a contract-by-contract basis.  Further, while there are no EU-
side small business categories, such categories exist at the Member State level.   
The Small Business Concordat: Good Practice Guide, published by the Office 
of the UK Deputy Prime Minister on March 1, 2005, provides a good example of 
such an approach (UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005). The Concordat is 
an attempt to guide local government procurements towards integrating socio-
economic considerations into the concept of best value for money, which is required 
by law and which balances “economy, efficiency, and effectiveness” (UK Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005).  As explained by the Deputy Prime Minister’s 
Office, 
                                            
90 Compare Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of Defense, 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (invalidating 
race-based preferences in Department of Defense contracting for lack of evidence of past discrimination in the 
legislative record) with AshBritt, Inc., B-297889, B-297889.2, 2006 CPD ¶ 48 (Comp. Gen. 2006) (validating 
state-specific local preferences for disaster recovery contracting). 
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[T]he Government’s definition of best value is the ‘optimum combination of 
whole life costs and benefits to meet the customer’s requirement.’  This 
approach enables sustainability and quality to be taken into account when 
service delivery options are being considered.  For example, the 
consideration of whole life costs allows factors such as fuel efficiency and 
replacement cycles to be taken into account, as well as social (e.g. benefits to 
local people, good workforce management, community safety, diversity and 
fairness.)  Successful procurement strategies are likely to be based on whole 
life cycle cost considerations that include subsequent revenue implications, 
and not simply the lowest initial tender price. (UK Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2005)  
The Concordat highlighted a contract clause which imposed the responsibility to 
contribute to “economic and social regeneration of the locality” in which the service 
will be performed.  The Concordat also highlighted the European procurement 
principles; the Local Government Act of 2000, which provided for general powers to 
English and Welsh authorities to promote “economic, social, and environmental well-
being;” and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000, which called for “the need 
to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, and to promote equality of opportunity and 
good relations between people from different racial groups” (UK Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, 2005).   
In the UK, remedial and sustainability criteria are also part of the procurement 
system at the national level.  For example, the 2006 Social Issues in Purchasing 
Guide of the UK Office of Government Commerce directs procurement officials to 
provide procurement assistance to “small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
including social enterprises (SEs), black and minority ethnic enterprises (BMEs), 
women’s and disabled-owned businesses, and the voluntary and community sector 
(VCS)” (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2006, February).  BMEs are defined 
in the Guide as businesses where a single owner with at least 51% stake or multiple 
owners with at least 50% total stake belong to ethnic groups other than white British.  
Social enterprises are defined as businesses which reinvest profits back in the 
business or in the community in order to maximize social objectives.  VCS 
organizations are run by volunteers to provide services that benefit the public, often 
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acting on behalf of the government.  These categories do not necessarily meet the 
EC definition of SMEs, raising the possibility that SME procurement assistance will 
be provided to business concerns which are not SMEs.91 
The Social Issues Guide also approves the use of procurement selection 
criteria related to hiring of the unemployed as consistent with the EC Treaty (EC). 
The Guide states that the European Commission will not disapprove of such criteria 
provided there is no requirement that the unemployed be from a certain area or be 
registered in national labor agencies (EC).  The Guide also indicates that such 
criteria will be sustained by European Court of Justice provided they do not 
discriminate against suppliers from across Europe in violation of the freedom to 
provide services and the right of establishment (EC).92   
The Guide indicates that socio-economic criteria may be used as 
requirements incidental to a contract objective, as core requirements of a contract, 
or as award criteria in cases of equal bids.   However, procedures to protect the 
application of these criteria from fraud or abuse appear to be lacking.           
Recently, the European Commission again encouraged the use of public 
procurement for remedial and sustainability purposes.  Section 46 of the EC 
Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC authorizes the use of broad socio-economic 
criteria as part of “the most economically advantageous tender” procurements 
awarded on the basis of “best value for money.”   The use of socio-economic criteria 
must be justified: 
If these conditions are fulfilled, economic and qualitative criteria for the award 
of the contract, such as meeting environmental requirements, may enable the 
contracting authority to meet the needs of the public concerned, as expressed 
in the specifications of the contract. Under the same conditions, a contracting 
authority may use criteria aiming to meet social requirements, in response in 
                                            
91 Cf. id. with The New SME Definition: User Guide and Model Declaration (EC). 
92 Citing Commission v. French Republic (Nord Pas de Calais), European Court of Justice Case C-225-98. 
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particular to the needs — defined in the specifications of the contract — of 
particularly disadvantaged groups of people to which those receiving/using 
the works, supplies or services which are the object of the contract belong. 
(EC, 2004, March 31, p. 46) 
Further, on September 30, 2008, the European Commission’s Directorate-
General on Competition published a Vademecum: Community Law on State Aid (EC 
Directorate General on Competition, 2008, September 30) containing generous 
exemptions from restrictions on state aid for purposes of regional development and 
assistance to SMEs.  While those exemptions are beyond the scope of this paper 
because they were not specifically targeted to SME participation in procurement, 
they seem to follow the general direction of European SME policies towards more 
SME-favorable measures.  Thus, there is little doubt that the Europeans are 
intellectually and practically welcoming to the use of socio-economic remedial and 
sustainability criteria in public procurement.  
C. Comparison 
It appears that the European and the US procurement systems have been 
used to advance similar socio-economic goals and objectives such as redressing 
discrimination against women and minorities, or promoting economic development in 
distressed areas.  Nonetheless, the US system provides clear system-wide criteria 
for remedial contracting, while the European system contemplates wide discretion by 
procurement authorities.  As a result, the US system appears to be comparatively 
easier to use by contractors, easier to administer by government agencies, and less 
likely to be abused by unscrupulous companies misrepresenting their status.  The 
clarity of standards in the US system also helps target remedial assistance to victims 
of past discrimination while reducing the potential for reverse discrimination.   
Consideration of sustainability in individual procurement is a task that requires 
additional administrative resources and creates the potential for greater ad hoc 
variations or abuse in the conduct of individual procurements.   
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VIII. Measures to Enhance Transparency and 
Availability of Public Procurement 
Information for Small Firms 
One other key procurement issue for small businesses everywhere has been 
the transparency and availability of information about government contract 
opportunities.  Here, again, the European and the US systems appear to be 
developing largely along the same lines.   
A. The US Approach: Maximum Opportunity By Law 
Studies conducted in the mid-Twentieth Century by Congress, especially by 
the Senate Small Business Committee, found that “small firms have difficulty in 
securing adequate information on proposed procurements or in securing 
specifications and bid seats” (Saltonstall, 1957, January 25).  Congressional 
leadership insisted that contracting agencies “must provide small firms with every 
opportunity to be placed on bidders’ lists or to have their products placed on 
qualified products lists (Saltonstall, 1957, January 25).”  In particular, the Senate 
Small Business Committee expressed doubt that agency “negotiated procurements” 
provide for full competition, and “continually recommended that negotiation be 
reduced in as many instances as possible and that advertised procurement become 
the rule rather than the exception” (Saltonstall, 1957, January 25). 
In the United States, Congress and the Executive Branch included numerous 
legally binding provisions ensuring maximum practicable opportunity for small firms 
into Federal law and regulations.  These requirements cover issues such as 
forecasting (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 637(a)(12)), publication and notice 
requirements (GSA et al., 2010, Subparts 5.1, 5.2), regulatory counseling,93 
                                            
93 See, e.g., USC Title 15 §§ 634b and 634c (2010); FAR § 19.202-4(c) (GSA et al., 2010). 
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interagency cooperation with the SBA (GSA et al., 2010, Subpart 19.4), time 
extensions (GSA et al., 2010, 19.202-1), uniformity in legal rules, studies and 
evaluations (USC, 2010, Title 41, Sections 405, 405a), determinations of 
competency or responsibility (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 125.5; GSA et al., 2010, 
Subpart 19.6), surety bond guarantees (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Part 115; GSA et al., 
2010, Subpart 28.2), and obligations of procurement officials to justify restrictive 
practices that exclude small contractors (CRF, 2010, Title 13, Section 125.5; GSA et 
al., 2010, Subparts 19.2, 19.4).   
For example, Section 8 of the Small Business Act94 requires Federal agencies 
with over $50 million in reported contracts to publish annual forecasts of all 
procurement opportunities by number, anticipated dollar values, time of issuance, 
and responsible activity.  Section 8 of the Small Business Act further imposes 
requirements to electronically publicize notices of contract opportunities over 
$25,000 on a government-wide portal and to publicly post notices of lesser 
opportunities (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 637(e); GSA et al., 2010, Section 5.101).  
The United States implemented uniform government-wide electronic advertising of 
contracts at one centralized point of entry, www.FedBizOpps.gov (GSA et al., 2010, 
Subparts 5.1-5.3).  The United States also requires electronic registration of its 
contractors in order to expedite evaluations and payments (GSA et al., 2010, 
Subpart 4.11); it merged Pro-Net, the registration database for small businesses 
interested in bidding for government contracts, into the general Central Contractor 
Registration database (SBA, 2003, December 23).  In order to assist small 
businesses with obtaining contracts, FAR Part 5 established a uniform policy for 
public advertising of Federal contracts above the micro-purchase threshold across 
all Federal agencies (with the notable exception of task orders under the indefinite 
                                            
94 USC Title 15 § 637(a)(12) (2010) requires agencies to make forecasts available to small businesses, the SBA, 
and agency OSDBU offices.  Agencies typically make these forecasts available on the internet.  See, e.g. US 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Acquisition Forecast (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) 
http://smallbusiness.doe.gov/business/acquisition_forecast.htm. 
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delivery/indefinite quantity contracts) (GSA et al., 2010, Section 5.101).  FAR Part 5 
also requires that solicitations provide adequate citations to laws and regulations 
which are binding on small business contractors (GSA et al., 2010, Section 5.102).  
FAR Subpart 19.2 sets forth further specific transparency and fairness 
policies to assist small businesses.  FAR Section 19.202-2 requires government 
agencies to “make every reasonable effort to find additional small business 
concerns” before issuing solicitations.  Among other things, FAR Section 19.202-4 
directs agencies to encourage “maximum response” to solicitation from small 
business concerns by allowing “the maximum amount of time practicable for the 
submission of offers,” providing specifications, drawings, or related information, and 
providing points of contact within Federal agencies on contract-specific issues.  FAR 
Section 19.202-1 requires agencies to “[e]nsure that delivery schedules are 
established on a realistic basis that will encourage small business participation to the 
extent consistent with the actual requirements of the government.”  Further, FAR 
Part 19 also references a number of procurement assistance programs overseen by 
the SBA.95  To assist small contractors with their financial capacity, the SBA operates 
a surety bond guarantee program.  FAR Section 19.202-1 requires agencies to 
divide contracts in order to ensure that every small contractor’s work can be 
guaranteed by the SBA through the surety bond program (CFR, 2010, Title 13, Part 
115).  The SBA Prime Contracting Assistance Regulations at Title 13, Section 125.2 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, echo many of these requirements and further 
impose on agencies the obligations to cooperate with the SBA in attainment of 
maximum practicable participation by small businesses.  The SBA may stop non-
compliant acquisitions and appeal them to heads of relevant agencies (CFR, 2010, 
Title 13, Section 125.2(b)(7); GSA et al., 2010, Subpart 19.4).        
                                            
95 See, e.g., John R. Tolle, Small Business Contracting – Part I, 99-11 BRIEFING PAPERS 1 (Oct. 1999) and 
Small Business Contracting – Part I, 99-12 BRIEFING PAPERS 1 (Nov. 1999).  
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Further, the SBA’s Certificate of Competency (COC) Program provides fair 
and independent evaluations of small firms who may be discriminated against 
because they are small.  Per Section 8 of the Small Business Act, the SBA is 
responsible for certifying to procurement agencies “all elements of responsibility, 
including but not limited to, capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity, 
perseverance, and tenacity, of any small business concern or group of such 
concerns to receive and perform a specific Government contract” (USC, 2010, Title 
15, Section 637(b)(7)(A)).  Government agencies are prohibited from passing over 
small businesses for award on any such grounds without referral to the SBA, and 
these agencies must accept SBA Certificates of Competency as conclusive (USC, 
2010, Title 15, Section 637(b)(7)(C); CFR, 2010, Title 13, Section 125.5; GSA et al., 
2010, Section 19.602-4).  Congress found that independent determinations of 
competency and responsibility through the SBA’s COC Program and its 
predecessor, the Small Defense Plants Corporation capability certification authority, 
are necessary to ensure not only fair consideration but also fair share of government 
contracts for small firms.96   Small businesses are exposed to prime contracting and 
subcontracting opportunities through the business matchmaking and procurement 
technical assistance counseling programs of the Small Business Administration 
authorized under Section 8 of the Small Business Act.  In 1983, Congress passed 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act which directed the White House to 
issue a uniform Federal Acquisition Regulation with due regard for impact on small 
business concerns and with special procedures pertaining to small business 
concerns (USC, 2006, Title 41, Section 405a).    In addition, government-wide and 
agency procurement regulations are reviewed by the SBA for their impact on small 
businesses.  To promote regulations favorable to small firms, Congress established 
within the SBA an independent office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy (USC, 
2006, Title 15, Section 634a).  These efforts resulted in synchronizing rules, 
                                            
96 See Siller Bros., Inc. v. United States, 655 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 456 US 925 
(1982) (describing the legislative history of the Certificate of Competency program). 
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reductions in regulatory burdens and improvements of transparency in government 
procurement as well as in other aspects of government operations.  Overall, the US 
measures on transparency, fairness, and regulatory relief for small contractors are 
well-established.     
B. The European Approach: Opportunity By Guidance 
In Europe, according to the 2004 EIM study prepared for the EC Directorate 
General of Enterprise and Industry, SMEs Access to Public Procurement Contracts, 
varying regulations and paperwork requirements for public contracts continue to 
present a major obstacle to successful participation of small business in government 
contracting (EC, 2004, March).  EIM noted the need for increased education about 
procurement procedures, the need for greater use of e-procurement, and the need 
to provide fuller information.  Even among SMEs successful in public procurement, 
around 30% of those surveyed in the EIM study do not feel they are properly 
informed about procurement opportunities.   
Publication of business opportunities appears to be the biggest challenge for 
European small firms, especially those new to the government contracting market.  
In accordance with the guidance of the European Commission, the “Tenders 
Electronic Daily” (TED) provides a centralized electronic advertising source for 
procurements above the Europe-wide monetary thresholds that are required to be 
published in the “Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union” (EC, 
TED).  However, authorities such as the UK Small Business Service and Office of 
Government Commerce acknowledged that procurements below these thresholds 
may be subject to a wide variety of advertising methods, and that small firms must 
be skilled in tapping into these resources in order to access government contracts 
(UK Small, 2004, November).     
The European Commission has addressed these concerns in its 2008 
European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public 
Procurement Contracts. Among other things, the Code makes recommendations on 
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SME assistance practices such as ensuring access to information, improvements in 
quality and understanding of procurement information, proportionality in 
qualifications and financial requirements, alleviation of administrative burdens, and 
affording SMEs sufficient time to prepare tenders. The Code encouraged European 
nations to develop single, nationwide procurement portals containing contract 
documents, as was already done in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (EC, 2008b, June 
25).97  Electronic tendering facilities are also encouraged.  With regards to accessing 
and understanding procurement information, the Code recommended personalized 
assistance, information centers, and training programs for SMEs.  In addition, the 
Code emphasized obligations to provide feedback to tenderers as required by the 
Public Procurement Directives.  Finally, the Code called for financing and 
qualification requirements that would not unduly exclude SMEs.    
C. Comparison 
Again, traditionally, the United States has been the leader in providing 
transparency, publicity, fair evaluations of competency, and other types of regulatory 
relief and assistance to small businesses.  Continuous leadership of the United 
States on these issues is, in large measure, ensured by their legally binding nature.  
However, these types of assistance are not presently central to the US procurement 
system.  Instead, their importance has been eclipsed by the emphasis on goals and 
set-asides.  In contrast, European Member States appear to strongly emphasize 
regulatory relief-type measures a major element of procurement assistance for their 
SMEs.  The obvious weakness with these European efforts in this area is that they 
are largely advisory, and there is no obvious mechanism to enforce them for the 
benefit of specific contractors beyond political mechanisms of the EC and Member 
State governments. 
                                            
97 The EC Code of Best Practices (2008b, June 25)  states. “In Latvia, all public tender notices are published on 
a single web portal which is accessible free of charge and offers daily news service.  In Estonia, there is a single 
online public procurement register for all contract notices which is the sole medium for publishing at national 
level.  Lithuania also uses a single web portal for all contract notices; this offers the possibility for multi-criteria 
search as well as user interfaces available in Lithuanian and English.” 
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IX. Subcontracting Goals, Guarantees, and 
Incentives 
A. The US Approach: Non-Binding Assistance Measures 
As early as the 1950s, Congressional leadership held the view that 
“everything possible [should]be done to encourage subcontracting to small business 
concerns” with regard to “a weapons system concept of procurement” Saltonstall, 
1957, January 25).  This sentiment found its way into the Small Business Act, which 
contains provisions identifying subcontracting goals for various small business 
categories (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 644) and directing the prime contractors to:  
establish procedures to ensure the timely payment of amounts due pursuant 
to the terms of their subcontracts with small business concerns, small 
business concerns owned and controlled by veterans, small business 
concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, qualified 
HUBZone small business concerns, small business concerns owned and 
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and small 
business concerns owned and controlled by women. (USC, 2010, Title 15, 
Section 637(d)) 
Section 8 of the Small Business Act also directs most large prime contractors 
to include a clause promising small businesses maximum practicable opportunity for 
participation in subcontracts (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 644).   Further, Section 8 
authorizes agencies to offer incentives for subcontracting to small firms.98  FAR § 
                                            
98 The incentive authority in USC Title 15 § 637(d)(4)(E) (2010) provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, every Federal agency, in order to encourage 
subcontracting opportunities for small business concerns, small business concerns owned and 
controlled by veterans, small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, 
qualified HUBZone small business concerns, and small business concerns owned and controlled by the 
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as defined in paragraph (3) of this subsection and 
for small business concerns owned and controlled by women, is hereby authorized to provide such 
incentives as such Federal agency may deem appropriate in order to encourage such subcontracting 
opportunities as may be commensurate with the efficient and economical performance of the contract: 
Provided, That, this subparagraph shall apply only to contracts let pursuant to the negotiated method of 
procurement. 
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19.708 also authorizes agencies to provide incentive fees and use small business 
subcontracting as award evaluation criteria.  Some agencies responded to these 
authorities by creating formal mentor-protégé programs, which gives large 
businesses that help small firms build capacity various incentives (such as proposal 
evaluation credits during competitions or the ability to count assistance costs 
towards subcontracting goals during contract performance).99   
Further, Section 8 of the Small Business Act, as implemented by Subpart 
19.7 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, generally requires companies that 
receive Federal contracts over $500,000 for products or services and over $1 million 
for construction to prepare small business subcontracting plans.  These plans are to 
be based on market research, and are to contain agreed-upon goals for participation 
of various small business categories.  The Small Business Act further provides that 
companies that do not conclude such plans within the time required by the agency 
will be denied the contract (USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 637(d)(4)(B-D).100     
                                            
99 See, e.g., US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Mentor-Protégé Program, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xopnbiz/smallbusiness/editorial_0716.shtm (last visited Sep. 16, 2009). 
100 USC Title 15 § 637(d)(4)(B-D) (2010) provides: 
(B) Before the award of any contract to be let, or any amendment or modification to any contract let, 
by any Federal agency which— (i) is to be awarded, or was let, pursuant to the negotiated method of 
procurement, (ii) is required to include the clause stated in paragraph (3), (iii) may exceed $1,000,000 
in the case of a contract for the construction of any public facility, or $500,000 in the case of all other 
contracts, and (iv) which offers subcontracting possibilities, the apparent successful offeror shall 
negotiate with the procurement authority a subcontracting plan which incorporates the information 
prescribed in paragraph (6). The subcontracting plan shall be included in and made a material part of 
the contract.  (C) If, within the time limit prescribed in regulations of the Federal agency concerned, 
the apparent successful offeror fails to negotiate the subcontracting plan required by this paragraph, 
such offeror shall become ineligible to be awarded the contract. Prior compliance of the offeror with 
other such subcontracting plans shall be considered by the Federal agency in determining the 
responsibility of that offeror for the award of the contract.  (D) No contract shall be awarded to any 
offeror unless the procurement authority determines that the plan to be negotiated by the offeror 
pursuant to this paragraph provides the maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns, 
qualified HUBZone small business concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by 
veterans, small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, small business 
concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and small 
business concerns owned and controlled by women to participate in the performance of the contract.  
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The goals for small business participation set forth in these subcontracting 
plans, however, are not legally binding.   The reason is that the Act penalizes only 
those prime contractors that fail to comply with the plan requirements in “good faith” 
(USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 637(d)(4)(F)(ii)).101  As long as a prime contractor can 
demonstrate that it conducted outreach to potential small business subcontractors, 
non-compliance with the goals will be excused under this “good faith” standard.  In 
theory, the penalty for non-compliance includes assessment of liquidated damages 
(USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 637(d)(4)(F)(ii)).  In practice, such assessments are 
virtually unknown.   
The SBA has traditionally assigned a 40% government-wide small business 
subcontracting goal (GAO, 2005, May).  According to the SBA, data small 
businesses received only between 35% and 36% of total subcontracts awarded by 
large prime contractors on Federal contracts during Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, 
and the small business subcontracting share drastically decreased to less than 29% 
in Fiscal Year 2008 (SBA).102   
Subcontracting policy in the United States is very unsettled at the present 
time.  In 2005, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that 
agencies should evaluate small business subcontracting based on percentage of 
total contract value in order to promote integrity, accountability, and meaningful 
small business participation (GAO, 2005, May).  This method is gaining popularity 
with Federal agencies, as it enables agencies to impose mandatory subcontracting 
                                            
101 USC Title 15 § 637(d)(4)(F)(ii) (2010) states, “The contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to 
demonstrate a good faith effort regarding compliance prior to the contracting officer’s final decision regarding 
the imposition of damages and the amount thereof. The final decision of a contracting officer regarding the 
contractor’s obligation to pay such damages, or the amounts thereof, shall be subject to the Contract Disputes 
Act of 1978 (41 USC. §§ 601–613).” 
102 Historically, however, small businesses have been receiving close to 40% of total subcontracted dollars 
government-wide (SBA, Office of Advocacy, 2006, September).  
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obligations on large businesses.103  However, to date, Congress and the Executive 
Branch have not yet imposed mandatory subcontracting obligations as a matter of 
national policy.104  Further, the GAO recently issued an advisory opinion which 
interprets the Small Business Act to allow for zero small business participation in 
subcontracting plans at the first tier of subcontracting.105  Thus, there is a strong 
possibility that allowing large firms to allot small firms a share of zero subcontracts at 
the first tier would render the Small Business Act’s subcontracting provisions 
meaningless regardless of whether subcontracting obligations are considered to be 
mandatory or merely “good faith.”  
B. The European Approach: Binding Assistance Measures 
European efforts to promote subcontracting have traditionally focused on 
improving access to information about subcontracts.  It appears that this approach is 
being increasingly phased out in favor of requiring prime contractors to comply with 
mandatory subcontracting obligations. 
Traditionally, it seems that Europeans have avoided mandatory 
subcontracting obligations in their national procurements.  As was noted by the 
British government in 2004, “[t]here is no single way of finding out about 
                                            
103 See, e.g., Nova Builders,  B-402091, B-402091.2, B-402091.3, 2010 CPD ¶ 33 (Comp. Gen. 2010) 
(mandatory subcontracting obligations imposed by the US Department of Veterans Affairs); Chair of the US 
Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship Olympia Snowe, Press Release, Snowe: Energy 
Department to Comply with Small Business Act’s Subcontracting Rules,  (June 20, 2005) 
http://snowe.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=d2f78f20
-5dd0-4cee-8dcd-9a3c0e6f3242&Region_id=&Issue_id= (announcing the Department of Energy’s agreement 
to follow subcontracting measurement recommendations in the Improved Subcontracting Oversight Report, 
GAO-05-459). 
104 The US Senate Small Business Committee has been attempting to pass legislation requiring total-dollar 
measurement of subcontracting obligations as recommended in the Improved Subcontracting Oversight Report, 
GAO-05-459.  See, e.g. Small Business Contracting Revitalization Act of 2010, S. 2989, 111th Cong. § 201 
(2010); Small Business Contracting Revitalization Act of 2007, 110th Cong. § 201 (2007); Small Business 
Reauthorization and Improvements Act of 2006, 109th Cong. § 1101 (2007). 
105 See Northrop Grumman Space and Missile Sys. Corp., B-400837, B-400837.2, B-400837.3, B-400837.4, B-
400837.5,  2009 CPD ¶ 52 (Comp. Gen. 2009). 
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subcontracting opportunities, although OGC is encouraging large suppliers to 
government to make subcontracting opportunities available via their websites” (UK 
Small, 2004, November).   
However, there is also a strong European precedent for mandatory 
subcontracting set-asides.  For instance, the European Space Agency uses the so-
called C1 and C3 Clauses which reserve certain subcontracts to non-prime 
contractors and SMEs.  Non-primes do not include large systems integrators 
dominating European aerospace industry such as EADS and Alcatel-Alenia Space.  
According to the ESA SME Policy Office, the C1 Clause reserves subcontracting 
opportunities to “equipment suppliers and SMEs,” while the C3 Clause reserves 
these opportunities to “SMEs and Research Institutes.”  ESA “[p]rocurements where 
the C1 and C3 clauses are used include those for technology research activities and 
for the development of equipment, components, or instruments – where SMEs and 
their partners have the necessary expertise, and there favoring these entities would 
result in a more efficient use of funds” (ESA).    The ESA also uses C2 Clause for 
non-primes and SMEs and C4 Clause for SMEs on procurements over EUR 
250,000.  These clauses request large primes to provide for adequate participation 
of SMEs in terms of quality and quantity, or to justify why such adequate 
participation cannot be achieved (ESA). 
Recently, the European Commission gave its strong endorsement to 
mandatory subcontracting set-asides.  To that end, Article 21(4) of the 2009/81/EC 
Defense Procurement Directive clearly states: “Member States may provide that the 
contracting authority/entity may ask or be required to ask the successful tenderer to 
subcontract to third parties a share of the contract.  The contracting authority/entity 
that imposes such subcontracting shall express this minimal percentage in the form 
of a range of values, comprising a minimum and a maximum percentage.  The 
maximum percent may not exceed 30% of the value of the contract.  Such a range 
shall be proportionate to the object and the value of the contract, and the nature of 
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the industry sector involved, including the level of competition in that market and the 
relevant technical capabilities of the industrial base” (EC, 2009).106  Recital (3) and 
Article 73 of the Directive indicate that the Directive is designed to promote SME 
participation in the industrial base.   The mandatory minimum operates essentially as 
a subcontracting set-aside required of prime contractors.  Article 20 of the Defense 
Procurement Directive also approves the use of subcontracting, including 
subcontracting driven by social consideration, as conditions of contract performance.   
Substantially similar language is found in the 2004/18/EC Public Procurement 
Directive (EC, 2004, March 31, Section (1), (46), and Article 26).  Indeed, the Public 
Procurement Directive also expressly states that “[i]n order to encourage the 
involvement of small and medium-sized undertakings in the public contracts 
procurement market, it is advisable to include provisions on subcontracting” (EC, 
2004, March 31, Section (32)).  These provisions would, in all likelihood, closely 
resemble the mandatory minimums approved in the Defense Procurement Directive.      
At the same time, the Europeans also treat subcontracting with SMEs as 
award criteria.  Section 1.4 of the EC Code of Best Practices states that “contracting 
authorities are encouraged to ask their main suppliers to demonstrate their track 
record in achieving value for money through the effective use of their supply chain, 
including how SMEs can gain access to their subcontracting opportunities” (EC, 
2008b, June 25).  The EC Code also emphasizes national practices such as 
publication of subcontracting opportunities and legal measures to discourage 
subcontracting terms that are less favorable than the prime contractor’s terms with 
the government.  Similar guidance is given in the European Defense Agency’s 
                                            
106 The Defense Procurement Directive language authorizing mandatory SME subcontracting obligations 
appears to be means to ensuring “meaningful” participation of European Member States with large 
concentration of SME defense firms without reliance on the principle of juste retour.  Cf. Georgopolous (2006, 
pp. 56-57)(describing the need to ensure “meaningful” participation of national SME defense suppliers). 
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COBPSC.107  The EDA further recognizes offsets, including subcontracting 
requirements to local industry, as one of the best-value award selection criteria 
(EDA, 2005, November 21).108    
C. Comparison 
Subcontracting policies in Europe and the United States are the mirror 
images of their own policies on prime contracting for SMEs.  In Europe, government 
agencies drive the awards of subcontracts to SMEs in a way that looks very much 
like legally binding reservations and set-asides at the prime contracting level in the 
United States.  In the United States, on the other hand, subcontract awards to small 
firms have been promoted largely through “good faith”-based subcontracting plans.  
Clearly, the European approach will bring more accountability to subcontracting if 
adopted in the United States.  At the same time, the European subcontracting policy 
of mandatory set-aside minimums demonstrates that Europeans are not as opposed 
to SME set-asides in principle as the European trade-related complaints about US 
set-asides may suggest.    
 
                                            
107 Specifically, COBPSC §§ 13, 14, 17 (EDA, 2006, May 15) provide:  
In assessing what is economically advantageous in the selection of Suppliers, it shall be taken into 
consideration that both Buyers and Suppliers need to take strategic sourcing decisions that are wider 
than individual contract or program requirements. [...] In evaluating tenders of Suppliers, buyers will 
consider, amongst other things, the approach undertaken or proposed for the selection of sources of 
supply (including, where appropriate, make or buy plans), having regard to the principles of the 
COBPSC. [...]  Monitoring arrangements will be introduced to assess the extent to which the COBPSC 
is being applied. It will be based on Prime Contractors providing information on sub-contract 
opportunities advertised. 
108 The Code of Conduct on Defense Procurement (2005, November 21) states, “The fundamental criterion for 
the selection of the contractor will be the most economically advantageous solution for the particular 
requirement, taking into account inter alia considerations of costs (both acquisition and life cycle), compliance, 
quality and security of supply and offsets.”  The European Commission defined offsets on defense purchases as 
follows: “This allows the purchasing country to require a return on investment that may exceed 100% of the 
value of the contract. Such offsets may be direct, in the form of orders for local companies or transfers of know-
 
=
=
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 96 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
                                                                                                                                       
how and technology related to the original contract. Offsets may also be indirect and concern industrial sectors 
other than the one covered by the contract in question, even non-military ones” (EC, 2004, September 23). 
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X. Use of Public Procurement to Stimulate 
Small Business Innovation 
Innovation is one area in which there appears to be a remarkable 
convergence in small business procurement policy between Europe and the United 
States.  While the United States exhibited early policy leadership in this area, 
European states are quickly following suit. 
A. The US Approach: Leading on Pro-Innovation Set-Asides   
In 1977, the White House Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Ad 
Hoc Interagency Panel on the Role and Difficulties of Small Firms in Selling R&D to 
the Government published a report, Small Firms and Federal Research and 
Development (OFPP Ad Hoc, 1978, August 9 and 10).109  This so-called Rabinow 
Panel was chaired by famous innovator and industrialist Mr. Jacob Rabinow with 
representatives from the OFPP, the Department of Defense, the National Science 
Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Energy 
Research and Development Administration (predecessor of the Department of 
Energy) and the Small Business Administration (OFPP et al., 1977, March 10, 
Appendix I).  The Rabinow Panel report found that "small firms receive about 8 
percent of Federal R&D awards to industry, and about 3.5 percent of obligations to 
all R&D performers, including in-house performers of R&D" (p. 432).  It concluded 
that "a striking disparity appears to exist between the capabilities of small technology 
based firms and their utilization by Federal agencies" (p. 434) and recommended 
that “Federal agencies should develop formal procedures which encourage the 
increase of Federal R&D awards to small technology based firms" (p. 436).  A year 
                                            
109 The OFPP Panel report is included in the record of hearings as Appendix I on pages 429-440, while report of 
William K. Scheier, Consultant to the Office of Federal Procurement, Office of Management and Budget, 
Executive Office of the President, Small Firms and Federal R&D: Background to the OFPP Report of March 
10, 1977, No. OMB/OFPP/CA-77/1 (Feb. 24, 1977) is included as Appendix II, at pages 441-461. 
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later, the House and the Senate Small Business Committees held hearings to 
encourage Congressional and Executive Branch actions to address this disparity 
and implement SME preferences for small R&D firms.110  However, creating such 
preference on the national level took another four years and direct Presidential 
leadership.   
In 1982, responding to President Ronald Reagan’s request, the United States 
Congress passed the Small Business Innovation Development Act, which 
established the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR).  According to 
President Reagan, “[t]he Small Business Innovation Development Act recognizes 
that we in government must work in partnership with small business to ensure that 
technologies and processes are readily transferred to commercial application” (1982, 
July 22).  Ten years later, in 1992, Congress passed legislation to create a 
supporting program, the Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR).  
Both programs are codified in Section 9 of the Small Business Act at Title 15, 
Section 638 of the United States Code.  Section 9 is implemented in the SBA’s SBIR 
and STTR Policy Directives.111  For SBIR and STTR purposes, commercialization 
includes sales to the government as well as to the private sector. 
In the traditional US set-aside approach, the SBIR Program sets aside 2.5% 
of extramural R&D funds at Federal agencies with over $100 million in extramural 
research and development funds for awards to small business (USC, 2010, Title 15, 
Section 638).  The STTR program applies to agencies with over $1 billion in 
                                            
110 Statement of Rep. John Breckinridge: “We want to ask: If small business creates more than 1/2 the 
innovations and does it for 1/2 the cost, why doesn't small business receive more than 1/2 the Federal research 
and development funds?” (OFPP Ad Hoc, 1978, August 9 and 10, p. 9); accord Small Business Technology 
Council, Why Are High-Tech Small Businesses So Important to the United States? (March 1, 2008). 
http://www.sbtc.org/docs/why_are_high-tech_small_businesses_important_to_the_us_-_final_3-1-08.pdf. 
111 See US SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, STTR POLICY DIRECTIVE, 70 Fed.Reg. 74,925-74,931 (Dec. 16, 
2005), with proposed amendment at 72 Fed.Reg. 23405 (April 30, 2007); SBIR POLICY DIRECTIVE, 67 Fed.Reg. 
60,071-60,085 (Sept. 24, 2002), as amended by 72 Fed.Reg. 23407-01 (April 30, 2007).  The amendments were 
designed to implement President George W. Bush’s Exec. Order 13,329, Encouraging Innovation in 
Manufacturing, 69 Fed. Reg. 9181 (Feb. 24, 2004). 
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extramural research and development funds, and sets aside 0.3% of such funds for 
award to small businesses that partner with nonprofit research institutions and 
Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers (USC, 2010, Title 15, 
Section 638).   
To participate in SBIR, SBA regulations require that a company must meet 
the 500 employee size standards and be majority owned by individual US citizens or 
permanent residents, or by a venture capital firm which is itself majority-owned by 
such persons (SBA, 2007, October 18).  To participate in the STTR program, the 
research institution must perform not less than 30% of the work and the small 
business must perform not less than 40% of the work.112  Three phases of awards 
are recognized under Section 9: Phase I is used to help a small business turn an 
innovative idea into an innovative solution meeting the government’s interests; 
Phase II is used to help a small business develop the commercialization of the 
solution; and Phase III is used for actual commercialization without the help of SBIR 
or STTR funds but relies on other government funding or private sector contracts 
(USC, 2010, Title 15, Section 638).  SBIR or STTR awards may be made using 
grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts.  SBIR and STTR programs include 
two rounds of competition; however, the SBIR Policy Directive clarifies that 
companies which received the SBIR awards at Phase I and II to qualify for sole 
source contracts at Phase III.113  Thus, the SBIR and STTR programs are hybrids 
between procurement and non-procurement funding.  Within defense procurement, 
Section 9 authorizes a special SBIR Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP) in order 
to accelerate transition of small business innovations into defense acquisition 
programs.  Some civilian agencies also have commercialization assistance 
                                            
112 See STTR POLICY DIRECTIVE, 70 Fed.Reg. 74,925-74,931 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
113 See STTR POLICY DIRECTIVE, 70 Fed.Reg. 74,925-74,931 (Dec. 16, 2005); SBIR POLICY DIRECTIVE, 67 
Fed.Reg. 60,071-60,085 (Sept. 24, 2002). 
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programs.114  The SBIR program generated tremendous return on a relatively modest 
investment.  According to the Small Business Technology Council (Glover), SBIR 
companies generate approximately 25% of the most important innovations over the 
last decade while large businesses generate less than 5% and universities 
approximately 8%.  However, small firms generally receive only 4.3% of Federal 
R&D and the non-SBIR/STTR share of such funding has been declining.  Thus, it is 
clear that the SBIR program is one of the few bright spots in the Federal 
procurement system that continues to place wasteful and inefficient R&D projects 
with large, entrenched contractors.  However, the SBIR and STTR programs face an 
uncertain future.  In 2008, the SBIR program was validated for reauthorization in An 
Assessment of the SBIR Program conducted by the National Research Council of 
the National Academies of Sciences (Wessner, 2008).  Despite endorsement of the 
National Academies and support among the small business community, Congress 
has resorted to short-term extensions for both the SBIR and the STTR programs 
since the end of September 2009 (US Congress, 2009, October 28, Sections 847, 
848; SBTC, 2010, January 28).115  As of early 2010, the United States is in danger of 
losing these crucial innovation tools due to legislative gridlock. 
B. The European Approach: Replicating Pro-Innovation Set-
Asides 
In Europe, according to another study done under the direction of the 
European Commission, “almost all countries have adopted measures to promote 
innovation in general, and in SMEs in particular” (EC Directorate).  Based on the 
study Innovation Policy in Europe 2004, it appears that Europeans are deliberately 
                                            
114 See, e.g. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Technical Assistance, (last visited Feb. 25, 2010) 
http://www.er.doe.gov/sbir/CA.html; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DHS S&T SBIR Program: 
Cost Match Feature (last visited Feb. 25, 2010) (https://www.sbir.dhs.gov/CostMatchInfo.aspx. 
115 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (US Congress, 2009, October 28, Sections 
847, 848) provides for one-year extension of Department of Defense SBIR, SBIR CPP, and STTR programs; 
Small Business Technology Council (2010, January 28): “This is the sixth [Continuing Resolution or] CR 
passed since the SBIR program was originally up for expiration in 2008.” 
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augmenting the principle of equal treatment regardless of company size with the 
concerted policy to promote SME innovation through public procurement.  In 
particular, the study recognizes “the intention of Sweden to mobilise demand 
through public procurement by the adoption of a Swedish version of the US SBIR 
programme” (EC Directorate).  The study also observes that “public procurement 
can play a major part in creating the demand for innovation,” and it noted the plan of 
the United Kingdom to use the “government’s purchasing power to support 
innovation” (EC Directorate).     
To implement this approach, the United Kingdom established the Small 
Business Research Initiative (SBRI).  As the acronym suggests, the policy model 
builds on that of the US SBIR.  The SBRI imposes a small business procurement 
set-aside of “at least 2.5 % of [the participating Government Departments’] research 
and development requirements” (UK Small, 2004, November).  The UK initiative also 
has an overall target of “£50 million of government research to be bought from 
smaller businesses by 2004” (UK Small, 2004, November).  SBRI is a form of “pre-
commercial procurement” based on exclusion of R&D from the EC procurement 
rules (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2009, July).  In the UK, the SBRI 
program is administered by the Technology Strategy Board, a stand-alone 
government agency funded by the Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills.  
Just like the SBIR program, the SBRI program has two developmental phases and a 
third phase involving procurement of a finished product, technology, or service.  
SBRI awards are contracts, not grants.  The SBRI Phase I program concerns 
feasibility of an innovation, while the SBRI Phase II concerns product development.  
Phase II participants are chosen through an assessment process at the end of 
Phase I.  At the end of Phase II “it is intended that what has been achieved will be 
manufactured and purchased by the Department [which established the need for the 
topic] as a way of fulfilling their procurement requirements” (UK Technology).  
The French government also actively promotes set-asides for innovative 
SMEs.  In 2005, then-President Jacques Chirac included SME set-asides and 
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preferences into his aptly-entitled national R&D policy announcement, Global 
Competition for Technological Supremacy:  
[T]he State has a responsibility to promote an environment which is propitious 
for the development of major industrial projects. This implies having clear 
strategic priorities: a small number of substantial stimulating programs - 
concentrated in a small number of key technological areas. It means that 
everyone involved, SMEs and research laboratories, must network around 
major enterprises. It implies a European dimension, without which any grand 
industrial goal would be futile. . . . I’d also like to convey a special message 
here to the leaders of the top French companies. . . Today, you must enter 
into a new partnership for progress with our nation. . . .[T]here’s a need to 
bring in the small and medium-sized enterprises, which, alongside you, are 
making an essential and increasingly essential contribution to growth and 
innovation. It is up to you to involve them more closely in your research efforts 
and enter into strategic joint ventures with them. For its part, the State, as the 
leading purchaser of technology, will undertake to provide incentives: the 
government will submit a proposal to the European Commission on a 
mechanism allowing some of the work in technology-related public 
procurement contracts to be reserved for SMEs. (Chirac, 2005, August 30)   
Under President Nicholas Sarkozy, France has continued pursuing measures 
to promote pro-innovation SME set-asides.  These measures included: “raising from 
€133,000 to €206,000 the threshold for application of the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement” (The Council, 2008, May 14); a 15% procurement 
participation share for innovative SMEs 2007, December 10), and monitoring of 
government agencies for their contract awards to small innovative firms (2007, 
December 10).   National SBIR-style programs have also been adopted in Finland116 
and the Netherlands.117 
                                            
116 See, e.g., NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AGENCY OF FINLAND - TEKES, Funding and Services for Companies in 
Finland: Small Businesses, 
http://www.tekes.fi/en/community/Small%20businesses/548/Small%20businesses/1420 (last visited March 1, 
2010). 
117 See generally, STRONG: Dutch SBIR Programme (Kingdom), which announces the Dutch Government’s 
intent to act as a “launching customer” for future high-tech SME suppliers with less than 100 employees. 
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In fact, the European Commission and other EU-level authorities have been 
themselves promoting SME innovation set-asides.  First, the Public Procurement 
Directive and the so-called Lisbon Strategy (which called for spending 3% of 
European GDP on R&D by 2010 in order to make Europe the most competitive 
place in the world) encouraged national SBIR-type reforms (Kingdom).118  Second, 
projects set aside for SMEs were funded as part of the European Commission’s 
Framework Programs for Research and Technological Development, as well as the 
EC’s Competition and Innovation Framework Program 2007-2013.119  The latest list 
of such funding opportunities related to the Seventh Framework Program may be 
found in the 2008 guide entitled European Union Support Programs for SMEs: An 
Overview of Main Funding Opportunities Available to European SMEs, published by 
the EC Enterprise & Industry Directorate General (EC Directorate, 2008, 
November).120  Third, the European Commission’s Strategy for a Stronger and More 
Competitive European Defense Industry identifies these funding opportunities as a 
way to stimulate the EU Defense and Technology Industrial Base, pointing out that 
“[s]pecific provisions have also been introduced to encourage SME participation in 
the 7th Framework Program for Research in the security thematic research area and 
through the 'Research for the benefit of SMEs' initiative including, raising the 
maximum [project costs] reimbursement rate for SMEs from 50% to 75% and 
introducing simplified participation rules” (EC, 2007, May 12).       
C. Comparison 
The United States has lead Europe in adopting pro-innovation small business 
set-asides to ensure that Federal R&D funding is spent more efficiently and does not 
                                            
118 Citing the exemption for R&D procurements from the 2004/18/EC Public Procurement Directive Art. 16(f) 
as well as EUR. COMM’N, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR RESEARCH, Expert Group Report, Public Procurement 
for Research and Innovation (Sept. 2005),  http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/pdf/download_en/edited_report_18112005_on_public_procurement_for_research_and_innovation.pdf) 
119 See, e.g., Petrou (2008, p. 150, note 48). 
120 Discussing R&D program cost reimbursement rules.  
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remain with the same, established contractors.  In Europe today, there is a virtual 
consensus that this policy instrument is necessary to spur innovation and 
international competiveness in the manner that is beneficial to the taxpayers and to 
the SME sector alike.  The United States must ensure that it does not squander its 
international competitive leadership by failing to reauthorize or otherwise support the 
SBIR and STTR programs.   
In terms of program administration, the US SBIR program appears to be more 
competitive than the British SBRI program.  This is because SBIR includes a 
separate round of competition at Phase II, which gives companies an opportunity to 
further improve the commercial potential of their Phase I research.  The British SBRI 
program contains a direct link to specific procurement programs of various 
government departments that were the source for research topics competed at 
Phases I and II.  The US SBIR program, save for the Department of Defense 
Commercialization Pilot Program, does not appear to have such a strong built-in link.  
This may in part account for the fact that SBIR traditionally funded R&D which can 
be also commercialized in the private sector and not merely through government 
procurement.      
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XI. Conclusion 
A.  Implications for Transatlantic Procurement Reforms, US 
Industrial Base and Innovation Policies, and US-European 
Trade 
The United States has historically lead the way in encouraging the 
development and growth of small business through public procurement and has 
reaped substantial socio-economic benefits such as a more competitive industrial 
base for civilian and defense needs, stronger innovation, and greater economic 
opportunity.  In recent years, the European Union, many of its Member States, and 
European agencies have sought to vigorously use public procurement in order to 
achieve similar results in their procurement systems and economies.   This effective 
transatlantic policy competition has enormous implications for procurement, defense 
industrial base, and innovation reforms on both sides of the Atlantic as well as for 
the future of US-EU trade relations.  
From the standpoint of procurement law and policy reform, the United States 
and Europe have much to learn from each other’s differences and similarities in their 
small business programs.  The US system generally emphasizes features such as: 
legal certainty and binding nature of small business procurement assistance; 
sensitivity to industry conditions in small business definitions; multiple anti-fraud and 
anti-manipulation measures such as a special protest system; independent small 
business advocates within the government who have top-level reporting and access 
to government leaders; multiple measures to reduce contract consolidation, 
including metric targets for benefits from contract  bundling; wide-spread use of set-
asides, goals, and reservations; clear and binding criteria for remedial and 
sustainable contracting with small firms; legally binding transparency, fairness, and 
other good government assistance measures; subcontracting assistance based on 
voluntary response to incentives or voluntary “good faith” efforts; and competitive, 
flexible pro-innovation set-asides.  On the other hand, the European systems 
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fostered by the European Commission and the European national policymakers  
emphasize features such as wide discretion in the use of SME assistance measures; 
simplified, user-friendly SME definitions for contractors and government officials; 
voluntary and generalized measures to reduce contract consolidation; emphasis on 
SME advocacy by procurement officials themselves; reliance on the use of SME 
participation as an award criterion or as a contract condition; use of set-asides and 
reservations in targeted circumstances such as framework agreements and space 
procurements; good government measures related to transparency and fairness; 
legally binding subcontracting minimum set-aside requirements; and procurement-
centered pro-innovation set-asides.   
Based on this assessment, policies largely in common across the Atlantic 
include pro-innovation set-asides, good government and regulatory relief measures, 
and pro-competitive measures to reduce contract consolidation.  The two sides also 
begin to share common approaches to prime contracting set-asides, goals, and 
reservations as Europe is expanding these measures across the board.  Europe, it 
appears, is at last firmly embracing the practical utility of these policy tools.  
However, there are certain differences in approaches across the Atlantic.  These 
differences raise questions of which approach is the more effective.  For example, 
the Europeans’ emphasis on transparency and regulatory relief is strong, but its 
effectiveness is doubtful because these measures are largely confined to non-
binding guidance.  With the HUBZone program being the notable exception, the US 
system places more emphasis on achieving positive socio-economic impacts such 
as jobs creation through the successes of individual small business enterprises, 
while the European approach addresses the socio-economic impact on a case-by-
case basis through award criteria or contract conditions in individual contracts.  The 
European approach is arguably less transparent, and may end up being less 
effective for that reason.  The US tradition of independent advocates dedicated to 
small business interests and placed within government agencies appears to be a 
more effective institutional design than the European model of merely requiring 
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procuring authorities to implement SME-friendly policies.  On the other hand, the 
United States has historically pursued a non-binding subcontracting assistance 
policy.  Such a policy can hardly be as effective as the mandatory minimum set-
asides increasingly pursued in Europe.   Further, the US small business definitions 
appear to more accurately reflect a company’s relative size within a given industry, 
while the European system appears to be more user-friendly.  The effectiveness of 
definitions depends on the relative importance of these objectives.  Importantly, the 
European definitions are definitely more supportive of jobs creation than US 
definitions because the European SME jobs-based size standards measure only full-
time jobs created by SMEs.  The United States should revise its definitions 
accordingly. In the end, while the small business procurement policy in the United 
States appears to be relatively more sophisticated and further advanced, the ever-
increasing size of the European common market and the convergence in 
transatlantic small business policies could compensate for the current limitations of 
the European approaches. 
 From the standpoint of US-EU trade relations, it is clear that the Europeans’ 
complaining about the US Small Business Act disregards similar European policies 
and practices.  The Europeans have a substantial history of set-asides and 
reservations in targeted procurement sectors and programs at the prime contracting 
level as well as subcontracting level.  Further, the Europeans have justified these 
measures based on the needs to increase international competitiveness and to 
promote a stronger defense industrial base.  Accordingly, policymakers in the United 
States must be mindful of the fact that competing foreign nations consider the Small 
Business Act of 1953 to be one of the most powerful industrial base and 
competitiveness policy tools, and seek to emulate the Act themselves.  Indeed, the 
Europeans seek to emulate the US Small Business Act in order to secure global 
technological supremacy, even though the SME share of European contracts 
appears to almost double the US share at the present time.  This would pose a 
serious long-term industrial competitiveness challenge to the United States defense 
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and civilian sectors if the US government fails to maintain strong set-asides and 
other small business preferences, especially for high-tech small firms.  In addition, 
European SME preferences contain multiple loopholes allowing for fraud and 
manipulation by large conglomerates, while enforcement measures appear to be 
lacking.  In these circumstances, the United States would be well-justified in refusing 
European demands to waive or repeal the Small Business Act.  Abandoning the 
Small Business Act or opening up US small business procurements to European 
firms would be shortsighted and detrimental to the US national interests.  This does 
not mean that the United States and Europe cannot ever negotiate a trade 
agreement to provide reciprocal procurement opportunities to each other’s small 
businesses.  However, such cooperation is better suited for limited procurement 
programs where both sides contribute financially, agree on a common definition of a 
small business and on related enforcement measures, and devise common 
assistance tools for small firms.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
procurements could be suitable for such an endeavor.  Finally, a common-sense 
approach for proceeding forward would involve the United Stated maintaining and 
strengthening the US Small Business Act while allowing the European SMEs the 
same exemptions from the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement that are 
presently afforded to US small business contracts.   
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2003 - 2010 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
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Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
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